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THE STATES AND THE SUPREME COURT*
A.E. Dick Howard**
Anyone who thinks that debate over the values of federalism-the place
of state and local interests in the affairs of the American nation-is largely
a concern of academicians need only look at recent opinions of the United
States Supreme Court. In April 1980, the Court ruled that municipalities
being sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (a civil rights statute dating back to
1871) may not plead as a defense that the governmental official who was
involved in the alleged wrong had acted in "good faith" (a defense which
the official, if sued personally, could assert).' Four justices dissented, com-
plaining, among other things, that "ruinous judgments under the statute
[section 1983] could imperil local governments."'
The Court made even more news when it held in June 1980 that plain-
tiffs could use section 1983 to seek redress of claims based on federal stat-
utes generally-in that case, the state of Maine had denied a family
welfare benefits to which they were entitled under the federal Social Secur-
ity Act.' Three dissenting justices argued unsuccessfully that section 1983's
reference to federal "laws" was in fact "a shorthand reference to equal
rights legislation enacted by Congress."' They saw the Court's ruling as "a
major new intrusion into state sovereignty under our federal system."' The
decision's implications for state and local budgets were made the more
significant by the Court's additional holding that under a 1976 federal stat-
ute a plaintiff who prevails in a section 1983 action is entitled to recover his
attorney's fees.6
The Supreme Court's section 1983 decisions furnish an apt vehicle for
* Copyright 1982 by A.E. Dick Howard. This article is adapted from an earlier
monograph, I'LL SEE YOU IN COURT: THE STATES AND THE SUPREME COURT (Nat'l
Governors' Ass'n, 1980).
** B.A., University of Richmond, 1954; LL.B, University of Virginia, 1961; M.A., Ox-
ford University, 1965. Professor Howard is the White Burkett Miller Professor of Law and
Public Affairs, University of Virginia.
1. Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622 (1980).
2. 445 U.S. at 670 (Powell, J., dissenting).
3. Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1 (1980).
4. Id. at 33 (Powell, J., dissenting).
5. Id.
6. The Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976 amended 42 U.S.C. § 1988 by
providing that in any action to enforce, inter alia, § 1983, the trial court, in its discretion,
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considering resolution of a central issue: what balance to strike between
the impetus for federal enforcement in a federal forum of civil and other
individual rights, and the enduring concern in the American polity for pre-
serving local control of local affairs.7 The Honorable Henry J. Friendly,
Senior Judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit,
admits to an ambivalence on this issue:
In approaching the subject of private litigation under the gen-
eral civil rights statute, I must own a Faustian conflict. It is hard
to conceive a task more appropriate for federal courts than to
protect civil rights guaranteed by the Constitution against inva-
sion by the states. Yet we also have state courts, whose judges,
like those of the federal courts, must take an oath to support the
Constitution and were intended to play an important role in car-
rying it out.'
In an age in which government at every level has taken on an ever-increas-
ing range of function, how this issue is resolved becomes ever more
important.
Section 1983 grew out of the period of the Civil War and Reconstruc-
tion, during which antebellum assumptions about the nature of federal sys-
tem were superseded by a greater emphasis on national power. In addition
to launching the thirteenth, fourteenth, and fifteenth amendments to the
Constitution, Congress enacted a series of civil rights acts. These were
aimed at overturning the Black Codes (enacted in southern states to curtail
the freedom of the former slaves), protecting voting rights, suppressing the
Ku Klux Klan, and securing equal treatment in public accommodations. 9
One of the statutes, section 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 (the Ku
Klux Klan Act), is codified today at 42 U.S.C. § 1983:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regula-
tion, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects or
causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or any
other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of
"may allow the prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee as
part of the costs." Pub. L. No. 94-559, § 2, 90 Stat. 2641 (1976).
7. See generally Developments in the Law-Section 1983 and Federalism, 90 HARV. L.
REV. 1133 (1977).
8. H. FRIENDLY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: A GENERAL VIEW 90 (1973) (footnotes
omitted).
9. Act of April 9, 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27 (1866) (outlawing Southern Black Codes);
Act of May 31, 1870, ch. 114, 16 Stat. 140 (1870) (protecting voting rights); Act of Feb. 28,
1871, ch. 99, 16 Stat. 433 (1871) (protecting voting rights); Act of April 20, 1871, ch. 22, 17
Stat. 13 (1871) (suppressing the Ku Klux Klan); Act of March 1, 1875, ch. 114, 18 Stat. 335
(1875) (prohibiting racial discrimination in public accommodations).
[Vol. 31:375
States and the Supreme Court
any rights, privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution
and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law,
suit in equity, or other proper proceedings for redress.
The statute was enacted to respond to lawlessness in many of the southern
states. Conditions were vividly described in Congress' debate on the meas-
ure: "While murder is stalking abroad in disguise, while whippings and
lynchings and banishments have been visited on unoffending American
citizens, the local administrations have been found inadequate or unwill-
ing to apply the proper corrective."'° President Grant, in his message urg-
ing adoption of the bill, stressed the need for federal power to supersede
local authority: "That the power to correct these evils is beyond the control
of state authorities I do not doubt.""
If one did not know something of the historical conditions that spurred
Congress' action, or something of the act's legislative history, the general-
ity of section 1983's language would give little enlightenment as to what
uses might be made of the statute. Justice Frankfurter once described the
statute as having been "loosely and blindly drafted."' 2 Obviously, judicial
interpretation would be required to tell just how far the act might go in
enlarging federal power and displacing that of the states and localities.
The post-Civil War Supreme Court was not willing to read national
power under the fourteenth amendment broadly. The Court's concern for
the states was evident as early as 1869, in its statement: "The Constitution,
in all its provisions, looks to an indestructible Union, composed of inde-
structible states."'I3 In the Slaughter-House Cases (1873), the Court gave a
narrow reading to the fourteenth amendment's privileges and immunities
clause, and in the Civil Rights Cases (1883), the Court underscored the
requirement of state action as a prerequisite for invoking the amendment's
protection.' 4 In such a climate, little use was made of the Civil Rights Act
of 1871. Indeed, between 1871 and 1920, only twenty-one cases were
10. CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 374 (1871) (remarks of Mr. Lowe of Kansas).
11. Message of Mar. 23, 1871, CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 299 (1871).
12. Stefanelli v. Minard, 342 U.S. 117, 121 (1951). In United States v. Williams, 341
U.S. 70, 74 (1951), Justice Frankfurter observed, "The dominant conditions of the Recon-
struction Period were not conducive to the enactment of carefully considered and coherent
legislation. Strong post-war feelings caused inadequate deliberation and led to loose and
careless phrasing of laws relating to the new political issues."
13. Texas v. White, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 700, 725 (1869).
14. The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873) (rejecting 14th amendment
attack on Louisiana's state-created monopoly in slaughtering); The Civil Rights Cases, 109
U.S. 3 (1883) (invalidating the Civil Rights Act of 1875 because it sought to reach private
discrimination). See generally Gressman, The Unhappy History of Civil Rights Legislation,
50 MICH. L. REv. 1323 (1952).
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brought under section 1983.15
For decades it appeared that section 1983 might be confined largely to
cases of racial discrimination, reflecting the historical concerns surround-
ing its origin.' 6 The seed of more ambitious uses for section 1983 was
planted in 1939, in Hague v. Congress of Industrial Organizations,1 7 in
which the Court affirmed an injunction against city officials who, acting
under a local ordinance, had been interfering with the organizing efforts of
labor unions.
The modern milestone in section 1983's development is the Court's 1961
decision in Monroe v. Pape. 8 A Chicago family sued thirteen Chicago po-
licemen and the city of Chicago, complaining that their constitutional right
against unreasonable searches had been violated by the warrantless ran-
sacking of their home and by Monroe's having been held incommunicado
at the police station until he was released without being charged. Justice
Douglas, writing for the Court, gave an expansive reading to section 1983.
For an officer to be acting "under color of" state law, it is enough that the
wrongdoer is clothed with state power; it does not matter that he may be
acting beyond his instructions. Moreover, Justice Douglas gave section
1983 one of its most important glosses: that even though there might exist a
state remedy to which an injured party could look for relief, the federal
remedy "is supplementary to the state remedy, and the latter need not be
first sought and refused before the federal one is invoked."' 9 Douglas did,
however, place one important limitation on section 1983, concluding that a
municipality could not be sued under the statute.2" This ruling immunized
from suit the defendant which most plaintiffs would naturally see as hav-
ing "deeper pockets" than individual defendants such as policemen.
In 1960, only about 300 federal suits were filed under all the civil rights
acts.2 ' In the fewer than twenty years since Monroe v. Pape, section 1983
has become a staple of litigation in the federal courts. In 1973, the authors
of a leading casebook on federal courts observed that Monroe v. Pape had
15. Comment, The Civil Rights Act. Emergence of an Adequate Federal Civil Remedy?,
26 IND. L.J. 361, 363 (1951).
16. See Shapo, Constitutional Tort. Monroe v. Pape and the Frontiers Beyond, 60 Nw.
U.L. REV. 277, 282-84 (1965).
17. 307 U.S. 496 (1939).
18. 365 U.S. 167 (1961). See also United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299 (1941), and
Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91 (1945), interpreting "under color of' state law for the
purposes of § 1983's criminal counterparts, 18 U.S.C. §§ 241, 242 (1976).
19. 365 U.S. at 183, 184-85.
20. Id. at 187-92.
21. Administrative Office of the United States Courts, 1960 ANN. REP. OF THE DIREC-
TOR 323 (Washington, D.C., 1961) (Table C2).
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led to "an impressive flood of litigation against state officers in the federal
courts."22 Four years later, the same authors found that flood to have
reached "epic proportions."23 In 1976, out of a total of 56,822 "private"
(i.e., not by or against the United States or its officials) federal question
cases filed in the district courts, 17,543-almost one out of every three-
were civil rights suits claiming constitutional protection against state and
local officials.24
Creative litigants and their lawyers have turned virtually any grievance
into a constitutional claim. Some of the complaints border on the trivial;
every one of the federal courts of appeals has had to worry with the ques-
tion of whether school dress codes requiring high school students to cut
their hair infringed a constitutional right.2" Much of the section 1983 liti-
gation, however, reaches far more substantial issues, such as racial dis-
crimination and legislative reapportionment. Section 1983 also has been
the vehicle for inquiring into areas previously largely untouched by the
courts, such as conditions in mental hospitals.26
Especially burdensome for the courts has been the flood of section 1983
petitions from state prisoners-troublesome because of their sheer volume,
the difficulty (given often incomprehensible drafting) of sifting meritorious
cases from the unworthy ones, and sensitivity about state interests in
prison security and administration.27 The increase in civil rights petitions
filed by state prisoners in federal courts has been remarkable-from 218
petitions in 1966, to 2,030 in 1970, to 12,397 in 1980.28
As section 1983 has increasingly become a tool of judicial activism, fears
have been stirred and criticisms voiced. Some observers worry about the
burden on the federal courts.29 Others are concerned about the risks to
which state officials are exposed. Former California Attorney General
22. P. BATOR, P. MISHKIN, D. SHAPIRO, & H. WESCHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND
THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 950 (2d ed. 1973).
23. Id. at 149 (2d ed. Supp. 1977).
24. Id.
25. See, e.g., Zeller v. Donegal School Dist., 517 F.2d 600 (3d Cir. 1975). See also
Howard, State Courts and Constitutional Rights in the Day of the Burger Court, 62 VA. L.
REV. 873, 927-29 (1976).
26. See O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975).
27. For Supreme Court decisions on prisoners' rights, see, e.g., Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S.
520 (1979); Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb. Penal and Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 1
(1979); Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308 (1976); Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215 (1976);
Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396 (1974); Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974).
28. Administrative Office of the United States Courts, 1971 ANN. REP. OF THE DIREC-
TOR 135 (Washington, D.C., 1972); 1980 ANN. REP. OF THE DIRECTOR 62 (Washington,
D.C., 1980).
29. See Coffin, Justice and Workability. Un Essai, 5 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 567, 570
(1971).
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Evelle J. Younger told of one state prison official who recently retired with
$200 million of section 1983 damage actions pending against him.30
Section 1983's impact on federalism is another concern. Dissenting in
Monroe v. Pape, Justice Frankfurter argued that proper respect for "our
federalism" should deter the Court from extending section 1983
beyond its manifest area of operation into applications which in-
vite conflict with the administration of local policies. Such an ex-
tension makes the extreme limits of federal constitutional power
a law to regulate the quotidian business of every traffic police-
man, every registrar of elections, every city inspector or investiga-
tor, every clerk in every municipal licensing bureau in this
country.3
During the era of the Warren Court, federalism often was a neglected
value. Using such vehicles as the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment, the justices in the 1960's plunged headlong into solving social
problems on many fronts-school desegregation,32 legislative reapportion-
ment,33 and criminal justice,34 among others. The Warren Court's juris-
prudence tended heavily to enhance national power whether of the federal
courts or of the other branches of the central government.
With the advent of the Burger Court, federalism seemed once again to
be in fashion. Ironically, it was a veteran of the Warren bench who
sounded the clearest federalistic motif as the seventies got under way. In
his last year on the Court, Justice Black called for his brethren to act on
the premise that "the National Government will fare best if the States and
their institutions are left free to perform their separate functions in their
separate ways,"35 a principle which, echoing his old arch-rival Justice
Frankfurter, Justice Black called "Our Federalism."3 6 And sure enough, in
the opinions of the Nixon appointees--especially Chief Justice Burger and
Justices Powell and Rehnquist-one is likely to hear more said about the
virtues of federalism and local control of local institutions than came from
30. Hearings on S. 35 before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the Senate Comm. on
the Judiciary, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 128 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Hearings on S. 35].
31. 365 U.S. at 242 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
32. See, e.g., Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968); Gibbins v. County
School Bd., 377 U.S. 218 (1964); Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958); Brown v. Board of
Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
33. See, e.g., Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964); Reynold v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533
(1964); Lucas v. Forty-Fourth General Assembly, 377 U.S. 713 (1964); Gray v. Sanders, 372
U.S. 368 (1963).
34. See, e.g., Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448 (1962); Smith v. Bennett, 365 U.S. 708 (1961);
Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
35. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971).
36. Id.
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the pens of those who made up the majority of the Warren Court.3 7
Many of the Burger Court's decisions applying section 1983 reflect this
heightened sensitivity to local and state interests. The Court has found sev-
eral ways to curb or at least moderate the reach of section 1983. One limi-
tation was bequeathed to the Burger bench by the Warren Court in
Monroe v. Pape-defining "person" in section 1983 so as to exclude states
and municipalities. A second limitation inheres in notions of comity be-
tween federal and state courts-the principle that federal courts ought
sometimes to defer to state tribunals before accepting jurisdiction of a dis-
pute. This deference takes two forms: abstention by a federal court so that
a state court may resolve an unclear state law (perhaps making decision on
a federal question unnecessary) and refusal to permit a federal court to
intervene in certain state proceedings, especially criminal trials.
A third way to curtail section 1983 is by conferring an immunity upon a
public official whose conduct is the object of complaint. Some immunities
are absolute, as in the case of judges or legislators. Such an immunity may
not be defeated by alleging that the officer acted out of malice or other
improper motive. Other immunities are qualified; they might be better
thought of as defenses. The best example is a defense of good faith-the
defense, for instance, that a police officer might offer in arguing that he
used reasonable judgment at the time of an arrest and, the state of the
relevant constitutional principles being unresolved at the time of the arrest,
he should not be held accountable for failing to predict the future course of
higher court rulings on the meaning of the fourth amendment.
Yet another way to limit section 1983 is in defining the underlying sub-
stantive federal right, constitutional or statutory. As section 1983 is not
itself the source of substantive rights but instead provides a remedy for the
enforcement of those rights, if the right claimed by a section 1983 plaintiff
does not exist, then there is nothing for section 1983 to enforce.
The Supreme Court has used all these avenues-the definition of a "per-
son," abstention (especially as to noninterference in state proceedings), im-
munities, and definition of the substantive right claimed-to limit section
1983. All of these devices will be discussed below.
Civil libertarians were quick to take alarm at Burger Court decisions
restricting access to federal courts. In 1976, top officers of the American
Civil Liberties Union, the Consumers Union, and seven other public inter-
est groups accused the Court of having "embarked on a dangerous and
37. See, e.g., National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 851-52 (1976) (Rehn-
quist, J.); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 493-94 (1976) (Powell, J.); Milliken v. Bradley, 418
U.S. 717, 741-45 (1974) (Burger, C.J.).
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destructive journey designed to dilute the power of the federal judiciary to
serve as the guardian of federal constitutional rights."38 A few months
later, the Society of American Law Teachers charged the Court with "forg-
ing a set of restrictive doctrines which will substantially reduce the availa-
bility of the federal courts for public interest litigation."39
Those who were disappointed with the Court's decisions turned to an-
other forum-Congress. When the Court interprets the Constitution, such
decisions are, of course, not subject to legislative repeal. Section 1983,
however, is a statute. As such, it can be amended by Congress. In January
1977, senatorial critics of the Burger Court's section 1983 decisions intro-
duced the Civil Rights Improvements Act of 1977.40 An omnibus measure,
the bill was explicitly meant to overturn judicial decisions which, in the
words of one of the bill's sponsors, had "drastically altered" the scope of
section 1983 and, in so doing, had "hurt those most in need of judicial
relief."'" Introduced as S. 35, the bill proposed, among other things, to: (1)
make states, municipalities, and other governmental units and agencies lia-
ble to section 1983 suits, (2) narrow the immunity available to prosecutors,
(3) make the doctrines of abstention and exhaustion of state remedies in-
applicable to section 1983 suits, (4) guard against the Court's making it
harder for federal courts to intervene in pending state criminal proceedings
(and prevent the extension of the noninterference doctrine to state civil
proceedings), (5) limit the circumstances under which the doctrine of res
judicata could be used to prevent the relitigation of questions in federal
courts, and (6) provide that the right to enjoy one's reputation is protected
by the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.42
Even when one recalls congressional efforts to ban court-ordered busing,
to permit prayer in public schools, or to curb access to abortions, it is not
likely that there has been a congressional bill which has sought to overturn
so many different Supreme Court decisions in one fell swoop as S. 35.
Legislative hearings in February and May 1978 attracted a parade of wit-
nesses for and against S. 35.43 The bill was introduced again in 1979 as
38. Letter from Aryeh Neir to participants in "Pound Revisited" Conference (April 7,
1976). The letter was occasioned by the convening in St. Paul, Minnesota, of the "National
Conference on the Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice,"
jointly sponsored by the Judicial Conference of the United States, the Conference of Chief
Justices, and the American Bar Association.
39. Society of American Law Teachers, Statement of the Board of Governors 31 (Oct.
10, 1976). The Society describes itself as having 500 members at about 25 law schools.
40. S. 35, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 123 CONG. REC. 554-59 (1977).
41. Id. at 554 (1977) (remarks of Sen. Mathias).
42. Id. at 557-58.
43. See generally Hearings on S. 35, supra note 30.
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(would you believe) S. 1983. It was somewhat altered from its 1977 ver-
sion; the provisions regarding the right to enjoy one's reputation and the
alteration of prosecutorial immunity were dropped." As of this writing,
the bill is still pending. It is now styled the Civil Rights Improvement Act
of 1981 and is numbered S. 990.45
We hear a good deal of behaviorist nonsense about the Supreme Court's
reading the election returns, following public opinion, or reacting to the
morning newspaper. Such notions caricature the judicial process. Never-
theless, whatever the cause, the Court does show shifts in direction. The
Burger Court is no exception. The late seventies resulted in a pattern of
opinions not readily predictable in the early years of the Burger era.46 In
section 1983 cases specifically there seem to be new initiatives. Where in
the early seventies the Court had seemed bent on restricting section 1983,
in the past two years the Court has manifestly enlarged opportunities for
plaintiffs to recover in section 1983 actions. This article began by pointing
to two such decisions, Owen and Thiboutot. An earlier breakthrough came
in 1978 when, in Monell v. New York City Department of Social Services,47
the Court overturned the holding in Monroe v. Pape that a municipality
could not be sued under section 1983.
After Owen and Thiboutot, a more conservative group of critics of the
Court's decisions introduced bills in Congress. Early in 1981, Senator Or-
rin Hatch introduced two bills-S. 584 and S. 585-to overturn those two
decisions. S. 584, aimed at Thiboutot, would amend section 1983 by strik-
ing "and laws" and inserting instead "and by any law providing for equal
rights of citizens or of all persons within the jurisdiction of the United
States."'48 S. 585, aimed at Owen, would amend section 1983 by giving
political subdivisions the defense that the locality had acted "in good faith
with a reasonable belief' 49 that the actions complained of did not violate
federal rights protected by the statute.
44. For the text of S. 1983 as introduced, see 125 CONG. REC. S 15994-95 (daily ed. Nov.
6, 1979).
45. For the text of S. 990 as introduced, see 127 CONG. REC. S3870 (daily ed. April 10,
1981).
46. See Howard, The Burger Court: 4 Judicial Nonet Plays the Enigma Variations, 43
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBs. 7 (Summer 1980).
47. 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
48. For the text of S. 584 as introduced, see 127 CONG. REC. S1628 (daily ed. Feb. 26,
1981).
49. For the text of S. 585 as introduced, see 127 CONG. REC. S 1628 (daily ed. Feb. 26,
1981). S. 584 and S. 585, as well as S. 990, were the subject of hearings in May and July
1981. See Municipal Liability under 42 U.S C. § 1983, Hearings before the Subcomm. on the
Constitution ofthe Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981) [hereinafter
cited as Municpal Liability Hearings].
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The Supreme Court's decisions interpreting section 1983 may be techni-
cal, but they are not academic. Civil rights groups, public interest lawyers,
and ordinary citizens look to section 1983 as an important avenue for re-
dress of federal rights denied. State and local officials, whether they make
policy (as on school boards) or have day-to-day contact with citizens (as do
policemen on the beat), may find their very fortunes affected by section
1983. Legislators and executives, especially budget officers, know that suits
brought under section 1983 can have wrenching effects on public policy
and finance. Whether they wish it well or ill, many people have reason to
follow the evolution of section 1983.
Following the Court's section 1983 decisions reminds one of watching
old-fashioned tableaux: each time the curtain rises, the scene has changed.
As many section 1983 decisions as there are already in the reports of the
Supreme Court, one may be sure that there are more evolutions to come.
In the next several sections of this article, I attempt to identify important
areas of interpretation:
1. Who can be sued (specifically, the liability of states and
municipalities);
2. In what forum may they be sued (federal and state courts);
3. To what immunities or defenses are they subject;
4. What federal rights may be vindicated; and
5. What relief may be granted (damages having been discussed above
under number 1).
I. STATES AND MUNICIPALITIES AS DEFENDANTS
Municpalies. Even as the Supreme Court, in Monroe v. Pape, breathed
new life into section 1983, the justices put the "deepest pockets" beyond
plaintiffs' reach. The Court ruled that in enacting the Civil Rights Act of
1871, Congress did not intend to bring municipalities within the statute's
reach.5" Thereafter, section 1983 plaintiffs sought ways of sidestepping
Monroe's roadblock. The avenues they explored included arguing that
where a municipality's immunity had been waived for purposes of state
law it should be deemed waived for a section 1983 action as well, distin-
guishing between damages (the Monroe situation) and restitution, and
seeking to imply a cause of action directly from the fourteenth amendment
itself.5 But Monroe continued to be a headache for civil rights plaintiffs.
50. Monroe, 365 U.S. at 187-92.
51. See Blum, From Monroe to Monell: Defining the Scope of Municipal Liability in
Federal Courts, 51 TEMPLE L.Q. 409, 414 (1978); LeGette, 42 U.S.C § 1983 Claims against
States/or Damages, 7 FLA. ST. U.L. REv. 525, 526 (1979).
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Indeed, in 1973, the Court made it clear that the conclusion that section
1983 was not meant to permit suits against municipalities applied to suits
against counties as well.52 In another 1973 decision, the Court held that the
nature of the relief sought made no difference; section 1983 no more per-
mitted equitable relief against a municipality than it permitted damages.1
3
A key provision of the Civil Rights Improvements Act of 1977 proposed
to make states and cities liable to suits under section 1983 by defining "per-
son" to include "any individual, State, municipality, or any agency or unit
of government of such State or municipality."54 At the hearings on S. 35, it
was unmistakably the consensus of the civil rights bar that, as one witness
put it, making governmental entities liable in section 1983 cases was "the
single most important aspect" of the bill.55 Another witness, speaking for
the United States Commission on Civil Rights, did not mince words about
why he wanted local governments exposed to damage suits under section
1983: "A municipality will generally have sufficient funds to pay judg-
ments, as opposed to individual officials. A municipality, as a defendant
with financial means, would probably not have the same jury sympathy as
an individual defendant."56 The same witness also thought that extending
liability to municipalities would be a more effective deterrent to constitu-
tional violations. Damage suits against officials, he said, "have been
largely ineffective in stopping officials from violating constitutional
rights."57
Opponents of making municipalities liable under section 1983 predicted
financial disaster were S. 35 to become law. An Ohio prosecutor, the presi-
dent-elect of the National District Attorneys Association, foresaw bank-
ruptcy for small localities:
Even now, it is practically impossible for local governments to
obtain insurance to protect themselves against such eventualities.
If S. 35 were passed, it would be impossible to purchase insur-
ance at premiums that even large jurisdictions could afford. In
my own situation, the last time we tried to get malpractice insur-
ance for me and my staff, we did not receive any bids from insur-
ance companies. We could not even buy it, and we do not have it
52. Moor v. County of Alameda, 411 U.S. 693 (1973).
53. City of Kenosha v. Bruno, 412 U.S. 507 (1973).
54. S. 35, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2(b)(2) (1977).
55. Hearings on S. 35, supra note 30, at 368 (testimony of Burt Neuborne, School of
Law, New York University).
56. Id. at 134 (testimony of Louis Nunez, Acting Staff Director, U.S. Comm'n on Civil
Rights).
57. Id. at 134. See Newman, Suing the Lawbreakers.- Proposals to Strengthen the Sec-
tion 1983 Damage Remedyfor Law Enforcers' Misconduct, 87 YALE L.J. 447 (1978).
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now. 58
Almost half of Ohio's counties have fewer than 40,000 people. In such
counties, he said, "relatively small judgments could mean financial disaster
for these governments."59
S. 35 (now S. 990) remains pending, but the Supreme Court has now
provided the advocates of municipal liability what they have long sought.
In Monell v. Department of Social Services,60 the Court undertook a "fresh
analysis" of the congressional debates on the Civil Rights Act of 1871 and
concluded that "Congress did intend municipalities and other local gov-
ernment units to be included among those persons to whom section 1983
applies."'61 To the extent that Monroe v. Pape made municipalities wholly
immune to section 1983 suits, that case is overruled by Monell. Monell
reaffirmed Monroe, however, insofar as Monroe held that the doctrine of
respondeat superior is not a basis for holding municipalities liable under
section 1983 for the constitutional torts of their employees. 62 As a result of
Monell, local governments can be sued directly under section 1983 for
damages, for declaratory judgments, or' for I injunctive relief. The local gov-
ernment's action that is being challenged may take the form of an ordi-
nance, regulation, policy statement, or any decision officially adopted and
promulgated by the governing body's officers. Indeed, a section 1983 ac-
tion may be brought to challenge a governmental "custom" even though
that practice may not have received formal approval through the gov-
erning body's official decision-making channels. It is enough that there be
found to exist some kind of de facto "policy."
'63
States. Efforts to expose states, as opposed to local governments, to suit
raise more complicated problems. It was the states that came together at
Philadelphia to draft the Constitution, and state by state they ratified it.
Unlike localities, states enjoy explicit constitutional protection, among
them the tenth amendment's reservation of certain powers to the states and
the eleventh amendment's restriction on extending the "Judicial power of
58. Hearings on S. 35, supra note 30, at 348 (testimony of Lee C. Falke, President-elect,
National District Attorneys Association).
59. Id.
60. 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
61. Id. at 665, 690.
62. Id. at 691-95. S. 35, in making states and municipalities "persons" under § 1983,
also would not have adopted a respondeat superior theory. S. 35 spelled out in some detail
the circumstances under which governmental units would be liable for the acts of their
agents. See S. 35 § 2(c)(1). See also Comment, Section 1983 and the Doctrine of Respondeat
Superior, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 935 (1979).
63. Monell, 436 U.S. at 690-9 1. See Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 167-68
(1970). See also Note, Municpal Liability under Section 1983," The Meaning of "Policy or
Custom," 79 COLUM. L. REV. 304 (1979).
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the United States" to certain suits against the states.64 Events of two centu-
ries-Civil War, Reconstruction, the enactment of the fourteenth amend-
ment, the creation of a national economy, and the massive rise of the
federal government's powers-have, of course, wrought enormous changes
in both theory and practice in federal-state relations. Yet, justices as unlike
as Douglas and Rehnquist have reminded us that federalism remains a
force to be reckoned with.65 The delicacy of assessing the impact of federal
legislation on the interests and functions of the states has special signifi-
cance when the Supreme Court is called upon to respond to efforts to make
the states defendants in private civil rights suits.
The eleventh amendment provides as follows: "The Judicial power of
the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or
equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citi-
zens of another State, or by Citizens or subjects of any Foreign State."
Although the amendment says nothing explicitly about suits against a state
by its own citizens, the Supreme Court has construed the amendment, in
light of its history, to bar such suits as well.66
The full force of the eleventh amendment has been muted by the
Supreme Court's decision in Exparte Young. 67 There, the Court ruled that
a state official acting unconstitutionally is in effect stripped of his official
character and can be enjoined, the eleventh amendment notwithstanding.
The result of the Young fiction is a paradox: an unconstitutional act by a
state official is state action for the purposes of the fourteenth amendment
(the official may even be acting against state policy or violating state law),
but an injunction against him is not an injunction against the state for the
purposes of the eleventh amendment.68 As a state can only act through
flesh-and-blood individuals, Young effectively permits equitable relief
such as that which might be sought in a section 1983 action.
What bar does the eleventh amendment interpose if a plaintiff seeks
damages rather than an injunction or other equitable relief. The plaintiff
64. The tenth amendment provides: "The powers not delegated to the United States by
the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or
to the people." The eleventh amendment states: "The Judicial power of the United States
shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted
against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of
any Foreign State."
65. See, e.g., National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976) (Rehnquist, J.,
opinion of the Court); United States v. Oregon, 366 U.S. 643, 649 (1961) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting).
66. See Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890).
67. 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
68. See Home Tel. & Tel. Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 227 U.S. 278 (1913).
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may, of course, seek damages against an individual officer without concern
for the eleventh amendment. But if he seeks a monetary judgment which
will be satisfied out of the state treasury, an eleventh amendment issue
arises.
Here, it is important to distinguish what Congress has thepower to do
from what it has done--or to be more precise-from how the Court goes
about deciding how far Congress, in legislating, intends to go. The key to
Congress' power is section 5 of the fourteenth amendment, which grants
Congress authority to enforce "by appropriate legislation" the substantive
guarantees of the amendment. Whatever may be Congress' power to over-
ride the states' eleventh amendment immunity by exercising an Article I
power (such as the power to regulate commerce), it is now clearly estab-
fished that the eleventh amendment gives way to legislation based on the
power given Congress under section 5. As a result, Congress may provide
for private suits against states or state officials which in other contexts
might be of doubtful constitutionality. By this reasoning, the Court has
upheld the power of federal courts to award money damages to individuals
found to have been subjected to employment discrimination in violation of
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.69 More recently, in upholding
awards of attorneys' fees (to be paid from state funds) under the Civil
Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976, the Court said that "Congress
has plenary power to set aside the States' immunity from retroactive relief
in order to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment.,
7
1
In Edelman v. Jordan ,7 ' however, the Court refused to allow section
1983 to be the basis for a retroactive monetary award against a state. Re-
cipients of benefits under a welfare program, jointly administered by the
federal government and the state of Illinois (Aid to the Aged, Blind, and
Disabled), were successful in alleging that state officials had denied bene-
fits the claimants were entitled to under federal regulations. The Supreme
Court held that, in a suit based on section 1983, a federal court must limit
itself to prospective injunctive relief "and may not include a retroactive
award which requires the payment of funds from the state treasury
$$72
69. Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976).
70. Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 693 (1978).
71. 415 U.S. 651 (1974).
72. Id. at 677. The plaintiffs had also invoked the equal protection clause of the four-
teenth amendment. Because the Court found the constitutional claim not to be "wholly
insubstantial," it held that the district court was correct in exercising pendent jurisdiction
over the statutory claim. This aspect of Edelman furnishes a good example of how a plain-
tiff, through artful pleading, could get a statutory question before a federal court where
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Five years later, in Quern v. Jordan," a sequel to Edelman, the Court
had before it the district court's requirement that state officials send a no-
tice to welfare applicants (Edelman having been a class action) explaining
state administrative procedures by which they could ask the state to deter-
mine whether they might be eligible for past benefits. The Court held that
the lower court's order constituted prospective relief of a kind permissible
under Edelman." Justice Brennan, who concurred in the result, took the
occasion to argue that the Court's intervening decision in Monell (holding
municipalities to be "persons" for purposes of section 1983) had undercut
Edelman. Brennan submitted that both the language of section 1983 and
its legislative history compelled the conclusion that Congress intended
states to be reached under the statute.75 The majority of the justices, how-
ever, disagreed with Brennan. Finding his evidence for any congressional
intent to bring the states within section 1983 "slender," the Court reaf-
firmed Edelman.76 States continue not to be "persons" for the purposes of
section 1983.
As the question of state liability to private suits under federal statutes
turns ultimately on Congress' intention, the question should be asked:
what evidence of that intention will the Court require? Must Congress
make clear in the language of the statute its intention to subject states to
suit, or may that intention be inferred from the statute's legislative history?
On this, the Court's decisions are unclear. In a 1964 decision,77 the Court
held that the Federal Employers' Liability Act applied to the state of Ala-
bama's operation of a railroad, even though the act mentioned neither the
states nor the eleventh amendment. Yet, in a 1973 case, 78 the Court rebuf-
fed the claim by employees of state mental hospitals that the Fair Labor
Standards Act entitled them to recover overtime pay. The statutory lan-
guage ("any employer") was broad enough to include states, but the Court
based its ruling on the lack of "clear language that the constitutional im-
munity was swept away."
79
In Hutto v. Finney,8° the majority resorted to legislative history in con-
jurisdiction might not otherwise have lain before the Court's ruling in Maine v. Thiboutot,
448 U.S. 1 (1980). See supra notes 3 and 5 and accompanying text.
73. 440 U.S. 332 (1979).
74. Id.
75. Id. at 349-66 (Brennan, J., concurring).
76. Id. at 338-45.
77. Pardon v. Terminal Ry., 377 U.S. 184 (1964).
78. Employees of the Dep't of Pub. Health & Welfare v. Department of Pub. Health &
Welfare, 411 U.S. 279 (1973).
79. Id. at 285.
80. 437 U.S. 678 (1978).
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cluding that Congress intended that awards under the Civil Rights Attor-
ney's Fees Awards Act of 1976 be assessable against states."' Dissenting,
Justice Powell thought that "we undermine the values of federalism served
by the Eleventh Amendment by inferring from congressional silence an
intent to 'place new or even enormous fiscal burdens on the States."'8 2
Powell thought the better rule was to require "statutory language suffi-
ciently clear to alert every voting Member of Congress of the constitutional
implications of particular legislation."8" Nevertheless, the majority con-
cluded that Congress could cause court costs (here, attorneys fees) to be
awarded against the states "without expressly stating that it intends to ab-
rogate the States' Eleventh Amendment immunity.'"84
The reach of the Hutto principle remained unclear. In a footnote in
Hutto, the Court implied that it would be more likely to infer congres-
sional intent to abrogate the state's eleventh amendment immunity where
Congress was acting under section 5 of the fourteenth amendment than
where the statute was based on an Article I power (such as the commerce
clause).8 5 In Quern v. Jordan,6 Justice Rehnquist sought to confine Hutto
by noting that Hutto was concerned only with expenses incurred in litiga-
tion seeking prospective relief rather than with liability for conduct occur-
ring before the litigation took place. Moreover, Rehnquist also read Hutto
as saying that the Court might well require "a formal indication of Con-
gress' intent to abrogate the States' Eleventh Amendment immunity"" if a
statute imposed "enormous fiscal burdens on the States."8 8 But Justice
Rehnquist did not feel obliged to reach the question of whether express
language would be required because neither the language of section 1983
nor its legislative history disclosed an intention to overturn the states' elev-
enth amendment immunity.
8 9
Unless the Court changes its mind, or Congress acts, a state as such can-
not be reached by section 1983.. It seems unlikely that the Court will alter
course. Aware of its 1978 decision in Monell stripping immunity from mu-
81. Id. at 694.
82. Id. at 705 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
83. Id. at 705.
84. Id. at 696.
85. Id. at 698 n.31.
86. 440 U.S. 332 (1979).
87. Id. at 698.
88. Huto, 437 U.S. at 697 n.27.
89. Quern, 440 U.S. at 334 n.16. Likewise, Justice Brennan, concurring in the judg-
ment, did not have to resolve the question of how explicit Congress must be, for he found
that both the language of § 1983 and its legislative history supported his conclusion that
Congress intended § 1983 to reach the states. See id. at 365 (Brennan, J., concurring in the
judgment).
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nicipalities sued under section 1983, the following year the Court voted
seven to two in Quern to reaffirm the Edelman holding that Congress did
not intend to reach the states by way of section 1983. Justice Brennan,
concurring in the result, complained that the parties in Quern neither
briefed nor argued the question of whether a state is a "person" for pur-
poses of section 1983.90 The majority opinion's adherence to Edelman is
too deliberate for one to suppose that they may decide, after all, to recon-
sider their position.
Nor is it likely that Congress will act. Although the Civil Rights Im-
provements Act of 1981 (S. 990) is pending in Congress, it seems fair to say
that the Court's Monell decision, bringing municipalities within the ambit
of section 1983, has removed much of the impetus for passage of this bill.
Moreover, even where relief is sought at the state, rather than the local
level, the scope of relief that can be had through injunctive remedies
(thereby avoiding the eleventh amendment problem) has grown steadily in
recent years. Especially is this true where relief of a systematic kind (as in
school desegregation cases) is sought.91
II. THE APPROPRIATE FORUM: FEDERAL COURTS V. STATE COURTS
Article III of the Constitution, which provides for the Supreme Court
and authorizes Congress to create lower federal courts, extends the "judi-
cial Power" of the United States to a wide range of subjects, among them
"all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of
the United States, and Treaties .... ." The judiciary article is, however,
not self-executing, and when the first Congress passed the Judiciary Act of
1789,93 the statute made almost no use whatever of the grant of judicial
power over cases arising under the constitution or laws of the United
States. For almost the first hundred years of the American republic, private
litigants looked to state courts for vindication of federal rights, subject to
limited review in the Supreme Court.
The spirit of nationalism associated with the Civil War and Reconstruc-
tion brought a series of acts expanding the jurisdiction of the federal
courts, culminating in the Judiciary Act of 1875.94 That statute gave the
federal tribunals both diversity and federal question jurisdiction to the full
extent authorized by Article III, limited only by the requirement that there
90. Id. at 354.
91. For discussion of the scope of equitable relief available against states, see infra notes
284-307 and accompanying text.
92. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
93. Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73 (1789).
94. Act of Mar. 3, 1875, ch. 137, 18 Stat. 470 (1875).
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be $500 in dispute. By virtue of the 1875 act, the federal courts "ceased to
be restricted tribunals of fair dealing between citizens of different states
and became the primary and powerful reliances for vindicating every right
given by the Constitution, the laws, and treaties of the United States."95
It was during this period of explosive expansion of federal judicial
power that section 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871,96 the forerunner of
section 1983, came into being. In the debates on the 1871 statute, one con-
gressman declared: "The United States courts are further above mere local
influence than the county courts; their judges can act with more indepen-
dence; cannot be put under terror, as local judges can; their sympathies are
not so nearly identified with those of the vicinage . . .,9'
To this day, the argument goes on between those who look to the federal
courts as the primary vindicator of federal rights and those who, noting
that state judges also are sworn to uphold the Constitution, would repose
more trust in the state tribunals.98 The primacy of federal courts in enforc-
ing federal rights underlies Justice Douglas' view in Monroe v. Pape-reaf-
firmed in subsequent cases-that the federal remedy created by section
1983 is quite independent of any state remedies, and that a litigant need
not seek or exhaust state remedies before invoking section 1983. 99
The preference for a federal forum for the litigation of federal claims is
often coupled with a distrust of state courts. Burt Neuborne, a law profes-
sor closely associated with the work of the ACLU, has attacked the "myth
of parity" between state and federal courts as forums for enforcing federal
rights. He fears that notions about parity, "at best, a dangerous myth,' °
may in fact provide "a Oretext for funneling federal constitutional deci-
sionmaking into state courts precisely because they are less likely to be
receptive to vigorous enforcement of federal constitutional doctrine." ''
Those who favor a federal forum advance a number of arguments, among
them that federal judges are more competent, that they have more exper-
tise in applying federal law, that the processes of selection and the fact of
95. F. FRANKFURTER & J. LANDIS, THE BUSINESS OF THE SUPREME COURT 65 (1928).
See also Frankfurter, Distribution of Judicial Power between United States and State Courts,
13 CORNELL L.Q. 499 (1928).
96. Act of Apr. 20, 1871, ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13 (1871).
97. CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 460 (1871) (statement of Rep. Coburn).
98. See generally Symposium, State Courts and Federalism in the 1980's, 22 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 599 (1981).
99. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 183 (1961). See also Damico v. California, 389 U.S.
416, 417 (1967) (per curiam); McNeese v. Board of Educ., 373 U.S. 668, 672 (1963).
100. Neuborne, The Myth of Parity, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1105-06 (1977).
101. Id See also Neuborne, Towards Procedural Parity in Constitutional Litigation, 22
WM. & MARY L. REV. 725 (1981).
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life tenure give federal judges an independence that most state judges do
not enjoy, that resort to federal forums is likely to yield more uniform
results, and that federal judges are more willing to intervene when other
organs of government fail to act.1
0 2
One of the hallmarks of many of the decisions of the Burger Court has
been a greater willingness to trust state courts. In 1976, Justice Powell
gathered a majority of the Court to curtail the opportunity of state prison-
ers to use federal habeas corpus to relitigate fourth amendment claims
which the state had already given the prisoner a full and fair opportunity
to air in state courts. One premise of Powell's opinion was that state courts
are equally competent with federal courts to hear and decide such
claims. 10 3 In another case, Justice Rehnquist declared that in adjusting the
boundaries between state and federal tribunals, the Supreme Court would
not act on the assumption "that state judges will not be faithful to their
constitutional responsibilities.""
There are several ways by which Congress or the Supreme Court could
enlarge the role of the state courts in deciding issues of federal law such as
those that might arise under section 1983. One would be to require plain-
tiffs to exhaust available state administrative remedies before resorting to
federal court. The Court's refusal to require such exhaustion follows from
the view (developed from Justice Douglas' Monroe opinion) of section
1983 as supplementary to state remedies. In 1976, Justice Powell observed
that the Court
has drifted almost accidentally into rather extreme interpreta-
tions of the post-Civil War Acts. The most striking example is the
proposition, now often accepted uncritically, that [section] 1983
does not require exhaustion of administrative remedies under
any circumstances. This far-reaching conclusion was arrived at
largely without the benefit of briefing and argument.'0 5
In a 1973 case, the Court hinted that the scope of the no-exhaustion rule
might be an open question-a suggestion from which Justices Brennan
and Marshall were quick to disassociate themselves."°6 The Civil Rights
102. Chevigny, Section 1983 Jurisdiction." A Reply, 83 HARV. L. REV. 1352, 1356-60
(1970); Neuborne, The Myth of Parity, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1105-06 (1977).
103. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 493-94 n.35 (1976).
104. Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 611 (1975).
105. Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 186 n.0 (1976) (Powell, J., concurring).
106. Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564, 574-75, 581 (1973).
In October 1981, the court granted certiorari to review a decision of the Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals requiring the exhaustion of adequate and appropriate state remedies
before a § 1983 action would be permitted to proceed in federal court. Patsy v. Florida Int'l
Univ., 634 F.2d 900 (5th Cir.), cert. granted, 102 S. Ct. 88 (1981).
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Improvements Act'of 1981 would codify the no-exhaustion rule. 10 7
Judge Friendly has called attention to the advantages of initially refer-
ring private civil rights disputes to state administrative or judicial
processes. Using the state procedures may avoid the need for federal court
action or, at least, may significantly affect the posture of the case once in
federal court. Moreover, resort to state procedures permits more direct par-
ticipation by the state, which has a legitimate stake in the outcome.
0 8
Judge Friendly has recommended that Congress provide that a federal
court faced with a case challenging to the constitutionality of state action,
whether raised under section 1983 or otherwise, shall abstain pending ex-
haustion of state administrative remedies whenever those remedies are
plain, adequate, and effective.' 09
The case for requiring exhaustion of state judicial remedies is less per-
suasive, however, in light of the burden in delay and expense such a rule
would thrust upon the would-be federal plaintiff. There may be special
circumstances when a federal court ought to abstain (as discussed below)
to permit a state court to clarify a question of state law. But to lay down a
general requirement of exhaustion of state judicial remedies would mean,
in effect, trying virtually all private civil rights cases in state courts, with
federal review only in the Supreme Court-an awkward and unwieldy so-
lution. If state interests are to be accommodated in an adjustment of the
no-exhaustion rule, it would seem to make more sense to give more oppor-
tunity for state administrative processes, with their attendant expertise, to
be involved so long as they are demonstrably adequate and effective, with
ultimate recourse to federal court if necessary.
Civil rights cases brought by state prisoners-a surging source of section
1983 litigation-present an especially appealing occasion for requiring at
least some measure of exhaustion of state administrative remedies. Curi-
ously, federal prisoners have been required to exhaust administrative re-
quirements, while state prisoners seeking federal judicial relief have not." 0
107. No court of the United States shall stay or dismiss any civil action brought
under this Act on the ground that the party bringing such action failed to exhaust
the remedies available in the courts or the administrative agencies of any State,
territory, or the District of Columbia, or subdivision, units, or agencies thereof.
S. 990, 127 CONG. REC. S3870 (daily ed. April 10, 1981).
108. H. FRIENDLY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: A GENERAL VIEW 76 (1973).
109. Id. at 101. At the hearings on S. 35, Edward T. Gignoux, a federal district judge
testifying on behalf of the Judicial Conference of the United States, also thought Congress
should move in the direction of requiring exhaustion of state administrative remedies. Hear-
ings on S, 35, supra note 30, at 316. See also Comment, Exhaustion o/State Remedies under
the Civil Rights Act, 68 COLUM. L. REV. 1201, 1206 (1968); Comment, Exhaustion of State
Administrative Remedies in Section 1983 Cases, 41 U. CHI. L. REV. 537 (1974).
110. Kenneth Culp Davis has criticized the dichotomy between requiring exhaustion in
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Moreover, state prisoners seeking federal habeas corpus must first exhaust
available state court remedies (not just administrative remedies).'" In-
deed, where state prisoners sought to bring a section 1983 action to chal-
lenge the state's action depriving them of good-time credits as a result of
prison disciplinary proceedings, the Supreme Court held that their sole
federal remedy was habeas corpus and that therefore state remedies must
be exhausted first." 2 In requiring exhaustion, Justice Stewart emphasized
the state's special interest in prison administration:
It is difficult to imagine an activity in which a State has a stronger
interest, or one that is more intricately bound up with state laws,
regulations, and procedures, than the administration of its pris-
ons. The relationship of state prisoners and the state officers who
supervise their confinement is far more intimate than that of a
State and a private citizen. . . . Moreover, because most poten-
tial litigation involving state prisoners arises on a day-to-day ba-
sis, it is most efficiently and properly handled by the state
administrative bodies and state courts, which are, for the most
part, familiar with the grievances of state prisoners and in a bet-
ter physical and practical position to deal with those
grievances.' 13
One might suppose that such arguments might apply to section 1983
actions by prisoners as well, but the Court has not gone so far. Judge
Friendly would require exhaustion of both state administrative and judi-
cial remedies in prisoners' section 1983 suits. 1 14 Ruggero J. Aldisert, a
judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, has
attacked the no-exhaustion rule as "an inefficient vehicle for protecting
prisoners' rights or achieving state penal reform."' Judge Aldisert relates
a conversation with a federal trial judge who, in attempting to improve the
lot of prisoners, was concerned that his efforts might have had the opposite
reviewing federal administrative action and not requiring exhaustion of state administrative
remedies. In his view, the no exhaustion rule exists "because of the judicial fiat .... The
judicial fiat cuts off reasoning about exhaustion." DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW OF THE
SEVENTIES 20.02, at 452 (1976).
111. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b) (1976).
112. Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475 (1973). The Court reaffirmed its cases, holding
that § 1983 is a proper remedy for a state prisoner who is challenging prison conditions,
rather than the fact or length of his custody. Id. at 498-99. A complaint seeking damages
for loss of good-time credits may be brought under § 1983, even though the prisoner must,
under Preirer, use habeas corpus to seek restoration of those credits. Wolff v. McDonnell,
418 U.S. 539, 553-55 (1974).
113. Preiser, 411 U.S. at 491-92.
114. H. FRIENDLY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: A GENERAL VIEW 103-07 (1973).
115. Aldisert, Judicial Expansion of Federal Jurisdiction.- A Federal Judge's Thoughts on
Section 1983, Comity, and the Federal Caseload, 1973 LAW & Soc. ORD. 557.
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result. Prison discipline had been crippled, guards were demoralized, and
many prisoners were at the complete mercy of other prisoners." 6
Certainly, whether the trial judge's experience was typical or not, there
is ample evidence that an undiscriminating flood of state prisoners' peti-
tions into federal court, with no thought for state remedies, carries serious
risks. Not only does it undercut the states' interest in prison administra-
tion, it also creates the risk of meritorious petitions being buried in the
mass of papers, some worthy of attention but many not. Some relief from
this condition may result from a provision of the Civil Rights of Institu-
tionalized Persons Act (enacted in May 1980), which states that in a section
1983 action brought by an adult prisoner, the federal court may continue
the case of up to ninety days "to require exhaustion of such plain, speedy,
and effective administrative remedies as are available."'
1 7
In Parratt v. Taylor," 18 Justice Rehnquist fashioned an analogue to the
exhaustion of remedies requirement as a way of curbing section 1983 ac-
tions. Parratt was a showcase for displaying Rehnquist's concerns about
opening the judicial floodgates. Taylor, a state prisoner, had ordered
hobby materials valued at $23.50. He claimed that through the negligence
of prison officials, he had never received the materials. When Taylor's sec-
tion 1983 action reached the Supreme Court, Rehnquist, writing for the
majority, summed up his concern about permitting 1983 recovery in such a
case:
To accept respondent's argument that the conduct of the state
officials in this case constituted a violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment would almost necessarily result in turning every al-
leged injury which may have been inflicted by a state official act-
ing under 'color of law' into a violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment cognizable under § 1983. . . . Presumably, under
this rationale any party who is involved in nothing more than an
automobile accident with a state official could allege a constitu-
tional violation under § 1983."
In Parratt, as in Paul v. Davis,120 Rehnquist was worried lest the four-
teenth amendment become "a font of tort law"' 2' superimposed upon the
states. Rehnquist's response, therefore, was to hold that the state of Ne-
braska provided a means for redressing Taylor's loss sufficient to satisfy
the requirements of due process of law. That being so, there was no depri-
116. Id. at 565-66.
117. Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a)(l) (1980).
118. 451 U.S. 527 (1981).
119. Id. at 544.
120. 424 U.S. 693, 701 (1976).
121. Parrait, 451 U.S. at 544 (quoting Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 701 (1976)).
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vation of property "without due process of law"-hence no basis for recov-
ery under section 1983.122
Another occasion to test the boundaries between state and federal
processes arises when a defendant, in opposition to a section 1983 proceed-
ing, seeks to have rules of res judicata or collateral estoppel, based on a
state court proceeding, bar the federal action. In Allen v. McCurry,123 Mc-
Curry, in his criminal trial in Missouri, had sought unsuccessfully to sup-
press evidence he claimed had been obtained as the result of an unlawful
search and seizure. Because McCurry failed to assert that the state courts
had not provided him with a "full and fair opportunity" to litigate his
fourth amendment claim, he was barred under the principle of Stone v.
Powell 24 when he later sought federal habeas corpus. McCurry then
brought a section 1983 suit against the state officers who had seized the
evidence. A federal court of appeals, invoking the "special role of the fed-
eral courts in protecting civil rights,"' 125 concluded that the 1983 suit was
McCurry's only route to a federal forum for his constitutional claim.
The Supreme Court held that the doctrine of collateral estoppel barred
McCurry's section 1983 claim. Justice Stewart, for the majority, denied the
notion of a general right to a federal forum: "The actual basis of the Court
of Appeals' holding appears to be a generally framed principle that every
person asserting a federal right is entitled to one unencumbered opportu-
nity to litigate that right in a federal district court, regardless of the legal
posture in which the federal court arises." '26 Stewart found no such princi-
ple either in the Constitution or in section 1983. Here, as in Stone v. Pow-
ell, the Court was unwilling to indulge "a general distrust of the capacity
of the state courts to render correct decisions on constitutional issues.' 27
According to the dissenters in Allen v. McCurry, the majority decision
clashed with the principle that section 1983 "embodies a strong congres-
sional policy in favor of federal courts' acting as the primary and final
arbiters of constitutional rights."'
' 28
Abstention is another means by which to adjust the boundaries between
federal and state courts. In abstaining, a federal court stays its hand pend-
ing a state court's resolution of a question of state law. Typically, the pur-
pose is to avoid the unnecessary decision of a federal constitutional
122. 451 U.S. at 544.
123. 449 U.S. 90 (1980).
124. 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
125. McCurry v. Allen, 606 F.2d 795, 799 (8th Cir. 1979) (citations omitted).
126. 449 U.S. at 103.
127. Id. at 105.
128. Id. at 110 (Blackmun, J., dissenting ) (citations omitted).
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question-a form of "judicial restraint" commonly associated with the late
Justice Frankfurter whose decision in Railroad Commission v. Pullman
Co. 129 remains the paradigm abstention decision. Some have argued that
abstention is inappropriate in civil rights cases, such as actions brought
under section 1983.130 However, in Harrison v. NAA4CP,' 3' a case arising
out of the troubled days of "massive resistance" to school desegregation in
the South, the Court ordered a lower federal court to abstain pending pro-
ceedings in a state court. Dissenting, Justice Douglas thought the ruling
clashed with the assumption underlying the Civil Rights Act of 1871 that
"the federal courts are the unique tribunals which are to be utilized to
preserve the civil rights of the people."'
' 32
Undoubtedly abstention serves the cause of comity, but one price paid is
delay in final adjudication of a dispute. Years may elapse between a deci-
sion ordering abstention and the ultimate disposition of the cases. 133 Some
justices have had grave doubts about the idea of abstention, and in the
heyday of the Warren Court, it looked as if the doctrine might be headed
for oblivion.' 34 One observer in 1967 declared that "the retirement of Mr.
Justice Frankfurter in 1962 left the abstention doctrine a judicial or-
phan."' 35 That pronouncement has proved premature. In recent years, the
Supreme Court has seemed willing enough to order abstention, sometimes
by unanimous vote. 1
36
The Civil Rights Improvements Act of 1981 would rule out abstention in
section 1983 cases.' 37 Senator Mathias, the bill's sponsor, has objected to
abstention on the ground that it forces litigants "to travel a more expensive
129. 312 U.S. 496 (1941).
130. See Wechsler, Federal Jurisdiction and the Revision of the Judicial Code, 13 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBs. 216, 230 (1948).
131. 360 U.S. 167 (1959).
132. Id. at 180 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
133. See, e.g., Spector Motor Serv., Inc. v. McLaughlin, 323 U.S. 101 (1944), in which
abstention was ordered. The Court's decision on the merits did not come until 1951, in
Spector Motor Serv., Inc. v. O'Connor, 340 U.S. 602 (1951).
134. See, e.g., such Warren Court decisions as Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360 (1964), and
Hostetter v. Idlewild Bon Voyage Liquor Corp., 377 U.S. 324 (1964).
135. Note, Federal-Question Abstention.: Justice Frankfurter's Doctrine in an Activist Era,
80 HARV. L. REV. 604, 604 (1967).
136. See, e.g., Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U.S. 132 (1976) (unanimous); Carey v. Sugar, 425
U.S. 73 (1976) (per curiam) (unanimous); Harris County Comm'rs Court v. Moore, 420 U.S.
77 (1975) (only Douglas, J., dissenting). On the abstention doctrine generally see Bezanson,
Abstention.- The Supreme Court and Allocation of Judicial Power, 27 VAND. L. REV. 1107
(1974); Field, Abstention in Constitutional Cases- The Scope of the Pullman Abstention Doc-
trine, 122 U. PA. L. REV. 1071 (1974).
137. S. 990, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § (e)(l)(C) (1981). A federal court would be permitted,
however, to certify a question of state law to a state's highest court where the state's proce-
dures permit such certification. Id. § (e)(l).
[Vol. 31:375
States and the Supreme Court
and longer road"' 38 than Congress intended when it enacted section 1983.
The Justice Department, however, opposes this provision of the bill. The
Department sees "no evidence that the doctrine of abstention is being
abused, or that the costs of delay and expense in cases in which the Federal
courts have abstained outweigh the benefits from reduction of friction be-
tween Federal and State governments and from elimination of unneces-
sary disruption of State policies."' 139 On a more general note, Judge
Friendly has questioned the wisdom of attempting to codify abstention; he
tends to think that it is best to leave it to the courts to work out on a case-
by-case basis.' 4 °
Still another way to defer to state courts is to prevent federal courts from
intervening in pending or impending state proceedings, such as criminal
trials. Notions of comity, as well as traditional equity principles, have led
the Supreme Court to fashion a rule that federal courts should not inter-
fere with proceedings in state courts, save in exceptional cases to prevent
irreparable injury."' There are important differences between Pullman-
style abstention and the noninterference principle. Perhaps the most im-
portant difference is that abstention simply postpones the exercise of fed-
eral jurisdiction, with a litigant free to return to federal court once a state
court has passed upon an issue of state law. The point of the noninterfer-
ence principle, by contrast, is that the party who as a defendant in a state
criminal proceeding wants to raise a federal constitutional claim must do
so in the state court. In such a case, federal jurisdiction is not merely post-
poned; it is not exercised at all, except by way of Supreme Court review of
the state court judgment.
In the 1965 decision of Dombrowski v. Pfister,'4 2 the Warren Court re-
laxed the noninterference doctrine somewhat, making it easier to get into
federal court for relief against a state proceeding. The advent of the Burger
Court, however, brought a tightening of the screws on federal court inter-
ference with state proceedings. In the leading case of Younger v. Harris,'43
138. 123 CONG. REC. 556 (1977) (remarks of Sen. Mathias).
139. Hearings on S. 35, supra note 30, at 41.
140. H. FRIENDLY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: A GENERAL VIEW 94 (1973). For a pro-
posed codification precluding application of the abstention doctrine in civil rights cases, see
AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, STUDY OF THE DIvISION OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN STATE
AND FEDERAL COURTS § 1371 (1969). In 1981, the Court held that the principle of comity
bars taxpayers from bringing a § 1983 damage action to redress the allegedly unconstitu-
tional administration of a state tax system. Fair Assessment in Real Estate Ass'n v. McNary,
102 S. Ct. 177 (1981).
141. See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971). See also 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1976).
142. 380 U.S. 479 (1965). See also Fiss, Dombrowski, 86 YALE L.J. 1103 (1977).
143. 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
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Justice Black invoked the theme of "Our Federalism" and laid down a
policy of comity and respect for state institutions. Thus, where Dombrow-
ski appeared to permit federal intervention upon a showing that a state
law being enforced in the state proceeding was on its face vague or over-
broad (and hence in violation of the first amendment), Justice Black in
Younger concluded that the arguably "chilling effect" of such a state law
did not justify prohibiting the state "from carrying out the important and
necessary task of enforcing these laws against socially harmful conduct
that the State believes in good faith to be punishable under its laws and the
Constitution."" Only if there was a pattern of bad faith or harrassment in
the enforcement of the law would there be irreparable injury of a kind
supporting federal injunctive relief.
145
In a series of cases, the Burger Court has extended the principle of
Younger. Although Younger does not apply where no state prosecution is
pending, the Court has held that Younger does stay a federal court's hand
where state criminal proceedings are begun after the state defendants have
gone into federal court but before any proceedings "of substance" on the
merits have taken place in federal court."n6 In another case, the Court ap-
plied Younger to a state contempt proceeding, even though the state was
not a party.147 Finally, the Younger bar has been held to apply to a civil
proceeding brought by the state in its sovereign capacity.
48
The Younger line of cases calls upon the justices to accommodate com-
peting values-the enforcement of federal rights on the one hand, and the
integrity of state judicial proceedings on the other. The justices who have
prevailed in the Younger line of cases recognize the post-Civil War role of
the federal government as a guarantor of basic civil rights against state
power. But, in striking a balance between federal and state interests, those
justices want to leave state institutions ample breathing room. Justice
Brennan, on the losing side of this line of cases, has accused the majority
of pursuing the "ultimate goal of denying § 1983 plaintiffs the federal fo-
rum in any case, civil or criminal, when a pending state proceeding may
hear the federal plaintiff's federal claims."' 49 Brennan sees the Court as
"eviscerating" section 1983 in decisions which operate as "deliberate and
conscious floutings" of Congress' mandate.'5s
144. Id. at 50-51.
145. Id. at 48, 51-52.
146. Compare Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452 (1974) with Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S.
332 (1975).
147. Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327 (1977).
148. Trainor v. Hernandez, 431 U.S. 434 (1977).
149. Juidice, 430 U.S. at 344-45 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
150. Id. at 343, 346 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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Civil liberties lawyers have hotly objected to the expansion of the
Younger doctrine. The Committee on Civil Rights of the Association of
the Bar of the City of New York has characterized the cases' trend as being
"unwarranted as a matter of legal principle, unhealthy in its practical con-
sequences for those who have been deprived of their federal rights, and
clearly violative of Congressional intent."' 1 Professor Neuborne has ob-
jected in particular to the "extremely dangerous" precedent set by permit-
ting Younger to come into play when the state proceeding is commenced
after the section 1983 plaintiff has invoked the jurisdiction of a federal
court-the effect being "to virtually invite retaliatory state prosecutions
aimed at section 1983 plaintiffs."' 52 Likewise, he is especially apprehensive
about the Court's "disturbing tendency to expand the Younger bar to civil
proceedings as well."' 53
The Civil Rights Improvements Act of 1981 would confine the Younger
principle's expansive tendencies. The bill would codify the circumstances
under which a federal court could enjoin a state proceeding. In so doing,
the bill would overturn most of the Burger Court's sequels to Younger. For
example, the legislation would require that, for the federal court to with-
hold injunctive relief, the state proceeding must have been commenced
before suit was filed in the federal court, and the bill would confine any
limitation on federal intervention to state criminal proceedings. Even




In addition to the question of liability of municipalities and states for
damages-addressed by Monell and Quern-there is the issue of the ex-
tent of potential liability of individuals who may be sued in civil rights
actions.' On its face, section 1983 says nothing about immunities for any
151. Hearings on S. 35, supra note 30, at 51-52.
152. Id. at 374.
153. Id See also Neuborne, The Procedural Assault on the Warren Legacy." A Study in
Repeal by Indirection 5 HOFSTRA L. REV. 545 (1977). For a sampling of the extensive com-
mentary on the Younger line of cases, see Bartels, A voiding a Comity of Errors:. A Modelfor
Adjudicating Federal Civil Rights Suits that "Inter/ere" with State Civil Proceedings, 29 STAN.
L. REV. 27 (1976); Redish, The Doctrine of Younger v. Harris: Deference in Search ofRation-
ale, 63 CORNELL L. REV. 463 (1978); Whitten, Federal Declaratory and Injunctive Interfer-
ence with State Court Proceedings: The Supreme Court and the Limits of Judicial Discretion,
53 N.C.L. REV. 591 (1975); Comment, Post-Younger Excesses in the Doctrine of Equitable
Restraint: A Critical Analysis, 1976 DUKE L.J. 523.
154. S. 990, 96th cong., 1st Sess. §§ (e)(3), (e)(4), & (e)(5) (1981).
155. See generally Cass, Damage Suits Against Public Officials, 129 U. PA. L. REV. 1110
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class of local or state officeholder, just as the statute is silent on the extent
of immunity, if any, for states or municipalities. Hence, with individuals,
as with states and municipalities, one must look to judicial decisions to
ascertain whether individuals can claim any immunity and, if so, in what
measure.
Common law immunities, such as those for legislators and judges, were
well established by the time the civil rights statutes of the Reconstruction
era were enacted. The Supreme Court has reasoned that, because of those
well-rooted principles, had Congress intended to abolish such immunities
in passing section 1983, it would have done so explicitly.'56
Some of the immunities thus recognized by the Court are absolute, that
is, a plaintiff cannot defeat an official's claim of immunity by arguing that
the official acted out of improper motives or otherwise in bad faith. State
legislators, judges, and prosecutors (when acting in their role as state's ad-
vocate) have been accorded absolute immunity. 57 The rationale of these
cases is that, without such immunity, officials might be deterred by the risk
of lawsuits from using their unfettered and independent judgment. The
Court does not suppose that these officeholders never act improperly nor
that citizens may not be injured as a result; rather, the Court has concluded
that, on balance, the rule of absolute immunity will better serve the public
good. 158
Other officers may claim only a qualified immunity. Where recognized,
such an immunity (or defense) permits an official to resist a damage judg-
ment on the ground that he acted in good faith, implementing a policy that
reasonably was thought to be constitutional. The qualified immunity saves
the official from running the risk that, although he acted reasonably and
without malice, he incorrectly predicted the future course of constitutional
law. Given the difficulty that even lower-court judges, law professors, and
other students of the Supreme Court's opinions have in predicting future
decisions (or often in interpreting existing decisions), it seems only fair not
to hold policemen or other public officials accountable for their similar
(1981); Schuck, Suing Our Servants: The Court, Congress, and the Liability of Public Officials
for Damages, 1980 SuP. CT. REV. 281.
156. See Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 376 (1951).
157. See id. (state legislators); Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967) (judges); Imbler v.
Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976) (prosecutors). In November 1981, the Court granted certio-
rari to decide whether judicial immunity extends to a Cook County circuit court clerk sued
in a § 1983 action. Murray v. City of Chicago, 634 F.2d 365 (7th Cir.), cert. grantedsub nom.
Finley v. Murray, 102 S. Ct. 501 (1981).
158. The injury may be quite severe, and yet the immunity recognized. See Stump v.
Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978), where a state judge ordered a tubal ligation on a 15-year old
girl who was told that she was having an appendectomy.
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lack of a crystal ball either.1 59
Since section 1983 is silent on the subject of immunities in general, it is
by judicial gloss that the Court decides who may claim a qualified immu-
nity, just as it decides who is entitled to an absolute immunity. The policy
judgment underlying the Court's recognition of qualified immunities re-
sembles that in the absolute immunity cases: "[I]t is better to risk some
error and possible injury from such error than not to decide or act at
all."' 160 Among those who may claim qualified immunity are police of-
ficers, prison officials, state hospital superintendents, and members of
school boards.
1 6 1
What of state governors and other high executive officials? One might
suppose that, given the tradition of the separation of powers and notions
about parity among the three branches of government, on both the state
and federal levels, governors or other policy-making officials in the execu-
tive branch might be accorded the same measure of protection as a judge
or a legislator. They are not. In litigation arising out of the disorders on the
campus of Kent State University in May 1970, the personal representatives
of the estates of three students who were killed when fired upon by na-
tional guardsmen sought damages from the Governor of Ohio, the Univer-
sity's president, and various Ohio National Guard officers and men. The
Supreme Court rejected the claim that the respondents were protected by
absolute immunity. ' 62 Instead, the Court laid down a rule of qualified im-
munity for executive officers. The scope of that immunity varies with the
discretion and responsibilities of the particular office, as well as the cir-
cumstances as they appeared at the time of the action on which a litigant
seeks to base liability.
163
As the existence of individual immunities, absolute or qualified, in sec-
159. See Sowle, Qualfed Immunity in Section 1983 Cases.: The Unresolved Issues of the
Conditions of Its Use and the Burden of Persuasion, 55 TUL. L. REV. 326 (1981).
160. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 242 (1974).
161. See Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U.S. 555 (1978) (prison officials); O'Connor v. Don-
aldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975) (state hospital superintendents); Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S.
308 (1975) (members of school boards); Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967) (police officers).
Immunity of a different sort from § 1983 suits was recognized by the Court's holding that
individual public defenders do not act "under color of state law" while performing a law-
yer's traditional functions as counsel to indigent defendants in criminal proceedings, even
though the public defenders are paid from public funds. Polk County v. Dodson, 102 S. Ct.
445 (1981).
162. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974).
163. Id. at 247. Likewise, federal executive officials are entitled only to qualified immu-
nity of the kind recognized in Scheuer. See Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478 (1978) (suit
against Secretary of Agriculture and other executive officials). Economou acknowledges ab-
solute immunity, however, for hearing officers or administrative law judges, agency officials
who make prosecutorial decisions, and agency attorneys who present evidence in hearings.
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tion 1983 suits depends ultimately on the Court's reading of congressional
intent in enacting the statute, Congress has the power to modify or abolish
those immunities. The Civil Rights Improvements Act of 1977 (S. 35), as
introduced, would have modified a prosecutor's absolute immunity by cre-
ating liability where a prosecutor failed to disclose to a defendant any ma-
terial favorable to the defendant.'64 This proposal created quite a stir. At
the hearings on S. 35, opposition to this portion of the bill was voiced by
several witnesses, including the spokesman for the Justice Department. 6 '
The president-elect of the National District Attorneys Association, himself
a prosecutor, said that during the previous four years he had been sued ten
times, for claims totaling almost $6 million, by defendants he had prose-
cuted. While "flattered" by the amount of the claims and comfortable
about the outcome under the present state of the law, he would be "very
uncomfortable" were S. 35 to become law.' 66 In the version of the bill as
reintroduced in 1979 (S. 1983) and in 1981 (S. 990), the provision altering
prosecutors' immunity has been deleted.
IV. MUNICIPALITIES' INABILITY TO INVOKE INDIVIDUAL OFFICERS'
IMMUNITY
Once Monell, in 1978, had stripped away the immunity that municipali-
ties had enjoyed under Monroe v. Pape, the question was posed as to the
extent of a municipality's liability for the acts of its officials and officers.
One position would be to make a municipality liable for the acts of its
agents under the same circumstances as a private employer would be liable
for wrongs committed by its agents-a theory of respondeat superior.
Under this approach, section 1983 would become a loss-shifting device:
"Thus, as between a wholly innocent plaintiff and a government entity
which, while not affirmatively culpable is, at least, causally responsible for
the loss, the loss should be borne by the government, not the innocent
plaintiff."' 67 In Monell, however, the Court explicitly refused to impose
this extent of liability on municipalities. Only when the injury may be
traced to governmental policy or custom will the government itself be re-
sponsible for the actions of its employees or agents.'
68
164. S. 35 § (d). This would have codified the position of Justice White (and two other
justices), who, concurring in absolute immunity for a prosecutor, would not extend that
immunity to suits charging unconstitutional suppression of evidence. See Imbler v.
Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 444-45 (1976) (White, J., concurring).
165. Hearings on S. 35, supra note 30, at 38 (testimony of Drew S. Days, III).
166. Id. at 349 (testimony of Lee C. Falke).
167. Id. at 372 (testimony of Burt Neuborne). A like position was taken by counsel for
the NAACP's Legal Defense Fund. See id. at 295 (testimony of Eric Schnapper).
168. 436 U.S. at 690-94.
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Civil rights lawyers were, of course, delighted with Monell, but they
were, as the NAACP's Eric Schnapper put it, concerned that issues still
remaining for resolution "could readily be used to nullify Monell'"6 9 and
to make the prospect of damage awards against governmental bodies illu-
sory. One question that surely worried civil rights attorneys was whether
the Court would hold that a government entity could plead, by way of
defense, that the official who had done the injury complained of had acted
in good faith-a claim of vicarious immunity in which, if the agent could
escape liability, so could the government.
Those concerned about the Court's next step were relieved (and perhaps
surprised) when in April 1980 it ruled, in Owen v. City of Independence,
that a municipality sued under section 1983 may not assert the good faith
of its officers or agents as a defense. 7 Justice Brennan's opinion, written
for the majority in the five to four decision, reflects two basic policies. One
is that if a municipality were able to assert a good faith defense, many
victims of municipal wrongdoing would be left without remedy. This is
essentially an appeal to fairness; since it is the public at large that benefits
from government activities, it is proper that the public at large be responsi-
ble when government infringes individual rights. The second policy is de-
terrence and is based on the supposition that officials who realize that a
municipality will be liable for injuries, whether resulting from good faith
actions or not, will have an incentive to err on the side of protecting citi-
zens' rights.
171
Owen may prove quite costly to municipalities in two ways: through the
imposition of money damages and, less obviously by its effect on public
officials' conduct. In an age in which wide publicity is given to enormous
jury verdicts, one can expect an increase of section 1983 suits to reach mu-
nicipal "deep pockets." Caught between inflationary expenses, taxpayer
revolts, and a form of strict liability under Owen, smaller municipalities
may find the going tough.
172
Hard figures on the full extent of the risk to municipalities are difficult
to come by. Justice Powell, however, dissenting in Owen, cited a recent
Alaska jury verdict of almost $500,000, awarded to a police officer accused
169. Schnapper, Civil Rights Litigation after Monell, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 213, 266 (1979).
170. 445 U.S. 622 (1980).
171. Id. at 650-53.
172. On the effect of Owen, see generally Jaron, The Threat of Personal Liability Under
the Federal Civil Rights Act Does It Interfere with the Performance of State and Local Gov-
ernments?, 13 URB. LAW. 1 (1981); Peters, Municipal Liability After Owen v. City of Indepen-
dence and Maine v. Thiboutot, 13 URn. LAW 407 (1981); Comment, Owen v. City of
Independence. Expanding the Scope of Municipal Liability Under Section 1983, 47 BROOK-
LYN L. REV. 517 (1981).
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of "racism and brutality" who was removed from duty without proper no-
tice and an opportunity to be heard. 173 On the other hand, staffers on Cap-
itol Hill, who informally surveyed section 1983 cases, have suggested that
the vast majority of section 1983 recoveries are less than $2,000. It may
well be, as Professor Abernathy has said, that the spectre of 1983 judg-
ments large enough to push municipalities to the brink of bankruptcy is
"by and large a figment of the imagination of after-dinner speech-mak-
ers."' 174 It is true that the sums demanded in complaints make better head-
lines than the sums finally awarded-the latter often a tiny fraction of the
original figure. But even so, the sums are hardly inconsequential. The Na-
tional Institute of Municipal Law Officers (NIMLO), admittedly not a dis-
interested party, extrapolated from a 1981 survey of 215 municipalities
(who reported $4.8 billion in pending claims) that there were claims of
$780 billion against the country's 39,000 local governments. If one percent
of those claims became judgments, it would mean an outlay of $7.8 billion
(to which one must add the cost involved in defending lawsuits). 175 Cer-
tainly an individual locality, faced with a large judgment, can take no sol-
ace in the observation that most awards are small. Consider, for example,
the danger posed to municipal budgets from judgments on behalf of corpo-
rations where large sums are at stake.' 7 6 A measure of the problem,
demonstrated in a report by one city attorney, is that many local govern-
ments are being forced to rely on self-insurance because they either cannot
afford or cannot obtain commercial insurance coverage. He traces this phe-
nomenon to the fact that there is no way to measure the scope or the cost
of the risks that local governments now face since Mfonell, Owens, and
Thiboutot. 
77
In 1981, the Supreme Court showed some sensitivity to litigious threats
to municipal finances when it ruled that a judgment against a municipality
may not include punitive damages.' In so ruling, Justice Blackmun ex-
amined both history-notably, that since 1871 American courts have been
virtually unanimous in denying punitive damages against municipalities-
173. 445 U.S. at 670 n.l I (Powell, J., dissenting) citing Wayson v. City of Fairbanks, No.
77-1851 (Alaska 4th Dist. Supr. Ct., Jan. 24, 1979), reported in 22 ATLA L. REP. 222 (June
1979).
174. Municipal Liability Hearings, supra note 49, at 41 (statement of Prof. Charles
Abernathy).
175. Id. at 86-87 n.18 (statement of NIMLO).
176. See Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557
(1980).
177. Municipal Liability Hearings, supra note 49 at 302 (statement of Roger F. Cutler).
178. City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 101 S. Ct. 2748 (1981).
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and public policy.' 79 In addition to observing that municipalities cannot
have malice (and thus that the rationale of punishing through punitive
damages is not served), Justice Blackmun noted the expanded liability to
which municipalities are subject since Thiboutot."' Adding the threat of
punitive damages, he posited, might create "serious risk to the financial
integrity"18 1 of municipalities, straining local treasuries and services avail-
able to the public at large.
Justice Blackmun's City of Newport opinion creates the impression that
the Court is not totally deaf to the anguish of local governments at the
Court's trend of of enlarging opportunities to sue under section 1983. The
City of Newport facts justify these concerns about the municipal fisc. A
musical concert promoter received permission from the city of Newport to
present a series of summer concerts. When members of the city council
discovered the promoters' plans to schedule the group, Blood, Sweat, and
Tears, the city fathers invoked fairly transparent grounds to seek to pre-
vent performances by what they characterized as a rock group. Arguing
censorship and other claims, the promoters brought a section 1983 action.
The jury awarded compensatory damages of just over $72,000, but puni-
tive damages of $275,000, of which $200,000 was awarded against the
city.' 82 Some officials have argued that City of Newport, in disallowing the
punitive damages award, should have further restricted the power to im-
pose punitive damages under section 1983.183
As for the conduct of public officials, Justice Brennan argued in Owen
that one of the traditional arguments for a good faith defense, that the
threat of liability may deter an official from being decisive in carrying out
the duties of his office, is largely absent when it is the municipality, rather
than the individual official, which is being sued.'8 4 It is hard to believe that
public municipal officials, responsible either to their superiors or to the
voters, would not be sensitive to the possibility of heavy damage suits. The
179. Id. at 2756-62.
180. Id. at 2761.
181. Id.
182. The trial court held that the $200,000 punitive damage award was excessive and
ordered it reduced to $75,000. Id. at 2753 n.8 (citing App. to Pet. for Cert. B-12 to B-13).
183. A representative of the National Association of Attorneys General, testifying at the
hearings on S. 584 and S. 585, thought City ofNewport did not go far enough. Except in the
"rarest of circumstances" states and localities undertake to immunize their officers from
damages by paying judgments entered against them for conduct undertaken in the official
performance of their duties. Thus, it would be "small comfort" that punitive damages could
not be assessed against the government itself. Hence this witness proposed that § 1983 be
amended to preclude the award of punitive damages against any defendant. Municipal Lia-
bility Hearings, supra note 49, at 529 (statement of Kenneth 0. Eikenberry).
184. 445 U.S. at 655-56.
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likelihood that officials would be looking over their shoulders is, of course,
one of the justifications for the majority result, to the extent that officials
may be encouraged to become more attuned to the constitutional bounds
on their conduct. But if large judgments against municipalities become
more common, public officials will surely feel pressures of the kind that
otherwise would support recognition of a good faith defense for individual
defendants.
Practical consequences aside, Owen creates some anomalous results.
First, in reading the seemingly unqualified language of section 1983, the
Court has refused to find in Congress' silence an intention to abrogate the
traditional qualified immunity for individual defendants; yet, from the
same silence, the Court has implied an intention to deny the same defense
to municipalities. Further, as Justice Powell points out in his dissent, the
Court imputes to Congress a willingness to impose a higher degree of lia-
bility on municipalities than exists in the law of the vast majority of the
states which recognize a qualified immunity for municipalities at least
equivalent to a good faith defense.' 8" If nothing else, Owen emphasizes the
remarkable degree to which a brief statute such as section 1983 means
what judicial gloss says it means.'
86
Senator Hatch's S. 585, introduced in 1981, would overturn Owen by
amending section 1983 to give municipalities a good faith defense, pro-
vided that they have a reasonable belief that the actions complained of did
not violate any right secured by the Constitution or by equal rights laws.
Professor Charles Abernathy notes that the good faith immunity proposed
by S. 585 "is really a very narrow immunity.' '1 87 Not only does the bill
require subjective good faith, but the defense would apply only where con-
stitutional law is unsettled-and "constitutional law contains quite a few
settled ideas, despite what it may appear at times."'8 8 Moreover, Professor
Abernathy values "very greatly" the principle that the essential thrust of
section 1983 ought to be deterrence rather than compensation. 8 9
V. DEFINING THE FEDERAL RIGHT
In 1939, in an effort to narrow the scope of section 1983, Justice Stone
said that the civil rights statute should apply only "whenever the right or
185. Id. at 678-83 (Powell, J., dissenting).
186. For an even more remarkable example, see discussion of Maine v. Thibouto, infra,
notes 222-59 and accompanying text.
187. Municipal Liabiliy Hearings, supra note 49, at 26, 39-40 (statement of Prof. Charles
Abernathy).
188. Id. at 26.
189. Id. at 27.
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immunity is one of personal liberty, not dependent for its existence upon
the infringement of property rights." '19 Justice Stone's distinction flowed
from two jurisdictional statutes. The first, old (pre-1980) 28 U.S.C. § 1331,
gave federal district courts jurisdiction over civil action arising under the
constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States where the amount in
controversy (since abolished by a 1980 amendment) exceeded $10,000.
The other, 28 U.S.C. § 1343, gives district courts jurisdiction over, among
certain other civil suits, those seeking to redress deprivation, under color of
state law, of any right secured by the Constitution or by an act of Congress
providing for "equal rights" or seeking relief under civil rights statutes.
Unlike old section 1331, section 1343 requires no minimum amount in
controversy.
If section 1983 were limited to nonproperty "liberty" rights, a litigant
seeking redress in federal court for infringement of a property right would
have had to satisfy old section 1331's amount in controversy requirement.
The Supreme Court, however, repudiated the liberty-property distinction
that Justice Stone sought to draw. In 1972, a unanimous Court declared
that "the dichotomy between personal liberties and property rights is a
false one 1 -one, moreover, not intended by Congress in enacting either
section 1983 or the jurisdictional statutes.
Some questioned the Court's conclusion. Judge Friendly opined that
Justice Stone "came closer to capturing the spirit of the Civil Rights Act"
that the Court, and that its framers, concerned with the rights of the eman-
cipated slaves in the South, "would have been no end surprised" to find
section 1983 being used to attack a state's garnishment statute or being
applied to a creditor's claim of the impairment of the obligation of a con-
tract.' 92 Judge Aldisert was even more acerbic: the Supreme Court, he
charged, "has made the federal court a nickel and dime court. A litigant
now has a passport to federal court if he has a 5-dollar property claim and
can find some state action."' 193 Such complaints notwithstanding, Con-
gress mooted the issue by eliminating altogether the amount in controversy
requirement with regard to federal question jurisdiction. Although this re-
quirement might have offered a means of narrowing section 1983, the 1980
amendment of section 1331 has foreclosed this option.
In Paul v. Davis, 194 Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, illus-
190. Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 531 (1939) (opinion of Stone, J.).
191. Lynch v. Household Finance Corp., 405 U.S. 538, 552 (1972). Three justices dis-
sented on another point, but not on the liberty-property issue. See id. at 556 (White, J.,
dissenting). Two justices took no part in the case.
192. H. FRIENDLY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: A GENERAL VIEW 91 (1973).
193. Aldisert, supra note 115, at 569.
194. 424 U.S. 693 (1976).
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trated how a civil rights action under section 1983 can be foreclosed by
holding that neither "liberty" nor "property" has been infringed. In Paul,
police officials had distributed five pages of "mug" shots of "active shop-
lifters to local merchants." Davis, whose picture was among those included
in the flyer, had been arrested for shoplifting, but the charges had not been
resolved. Indeed, soon after the flyer's circulation, the charges were
dropped.
Davis filed a section 1983 action, claiming that by labeling him an "ac-
tive shoplifter," the police had deprived him of an interest protected by the
fourteenth amendment. Justice Rehnquist disagreed. Canvassing the inter-
play between state law and the Constitution, he held that "the interest in
reputation asserted in this case is neither 'liberty' nor 'property' guaranteed
against state deprivation without due proces of law."
1 95
The key to Justice Rehnquist's opinion lies in his concern that, if "lib-
erty" and "property" be read too expansively, federal civil rights statutes
would swallow up state law. As he observed, Davis' complaint "would ap-
pear to state a classical claim for defamation actionable in the courts of
virtually every State." '196 Rehnquist was not willing to see traditional state
tort law converted so easily into a claim of federal right:
It is hard to perceive any logical stopping place to such a line of
reasoning. Respondent's construction would seem almost neces-
sarily to result in every legally cognizable injury which may have
been inflicted by a state official acting under 'color of law' estab-
lishing a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.'97
In short, Justice Rehnquist refused to permit the due process clause to be
used to transform the civil rights statutes into "a body of general federal
tort law." 1
98
Paul v. Davis shows how to narrow the reach of section 1983 by refusing
to recognize that any substantive federal rights are involved. A restrictive
view of the fourteenth amendment's protection of "liberty" or "property"
carries with it a concomitant narrowing of what may be done by way of
section 1983.199 This vexed Justice Brennan, who, dissenting in Paul, cor-
195. Id. at 712. Justice Rehnquist also rejected the argument that a right of "privacy"
had been violated. Id. at 712-13.
196. Id. at 697.
197. Id. at 698-99.
198. Id. at 701. For incisive discussion of the overlap between state tort law remedies
and remedies under § 1983, see Whitman, Constitutional Torts, 79 MICH. L. REV. 5 (1980).
Among the concerns voiced by Professor Whitman is that a result of extending the sphere of
the Constitution through § 1983 actions is "a dramatic increase in the workload of the fed-
eral courts, and substantial encroachment on the authority of the states." Id. at 10.
199. For another example of defeating § 1983 relief by finding that there is no constitu-
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plained that rather than balancing the individual's interest in reputation
against the needs of law enforcement, the majority "by mere fiat and with
no analysis wholly excludes personal interest in reputation" from the am-
bit of the fourteenth amendment.2°
Civil libertarians were outraged at Paul v. Davis. When S. 35 (the Civil
Rights Improvements Act of 1977) was drafted, a provision was included
explicitly stating that the "right to enjoy one's reputation is a right secured
by the due process clause" of the fourteenth amendment. 20 1 As the spon-
sor's remarks made clear, this provision was aimed directly at overruling
Paul v. Davis.
20 2
From the standpoint of Congress' proper role vis-A-vis Supreme Court
opinions, the effort to overturn Paul v. Davis legislatively was the most
dubious feature of S. 35. The other provisions of the bill, most of them tied
quite directly to adjusting the reach of section 1983 as such, fell safely
within Congress' legitimate concern. The anti-Paul provision, however,
edged nearer to dangerous terrain because it would have engaged Con-
gress in defining the substantive constitutional equivalent of conservatives'
efforts to overturn reapportionment, busing, school prayer, and other judi-
cial decisions by using Congress' powers to define the jurisdiction of the
federal courts. All such efforts are fraught with danger, for if Congress can
confer more due process, it may be able to require less. The safest course is
for Congress, however much it may dislike a judicial opinion, to stay out
of the business of redefining constitutional rights.
Reintroduced as S. 990, the Civil Rights Improvements Act's current
version omits any provision dealing with Paul v. Davis. Perhaps the spon-
sors were concerned about the dubious propriety of Congress' attempting
to redefine constitutional rights. Or it may be that, in the process of legisla-
tive drafting and political compromise, the anti-Paul provision was simply
a bargaining point which could be dropped from the measure in the inter-
ests of other provisions far more central to the sponsors' concerns. In any
tional right involved, see Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977), in which the Court re-
jected the argument of public school students who had been paddled that corporal
punishment raised an issue under the cruel and unusual punishment clause of the eighth
amendment. Justice Stewart, concurring in Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 544-45 (1981),
argued that, where a state prisoner brought a § 1983 action complaining that prison officials
had negligently lost hobby materials he had ordered through the mail, it was not the kind of
property deprivation to which the fourteenth amendment was addressed. Even if Nebraska
had deprived him of property in the constitutional sense, it had not done so without due
process of law (on this point, he agreed with the rationale of Justice Rehnquist's majority
opinion).
200. 424 U.S. at 721 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
201. S. 35, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2(2)(b)(2) (1977).
202. See 123 CONG. REc. 556 (1977) (remarks of Sen. Mathias).
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event, the further evolution of the Paul v. Davis issue is wisely left to the
Court.
Another route to narrow section 1983 might be found in an interpreta-
tion of the statute's use of the word "deprivation." When the statute pro-
vides that persons acting under color of state law shall be liable if they
subject others to the "deprivation" of rights secured by the Constitution
and laws of the United States, does that provision require that the action
resulting in a deprivation be an intentional one? Or may section 1983 lia-
bility be founded upon an actor's negligence? A state of mind requirement
would obviously be another avenue to limiting the occasions when section
1983 could be invoked.
An eye-catching 1981 case illustrates the relevance of this question. In
Parratt v. Taylor,2 °3 a state prisoner brought a section 1983 action com-
plaining that prison officials had negligently lost hobby materials, valued
at $23.50, which he had ordered by mail. Justice Powell would have ruled
that a negligent act, causing an unintended loss or injury to property, does
not result in a "deprivation" in the constitutional sense.2 1 Powell's under-
lying concern was that to permit negligence to be the basis for a section
1983 action would furnish yet one more impetus to using the statute far
beyond its intended purposes:
The present case, involving a $23 loss, illustrates the extent to
which constitutional law has been trivialized, and federal courts
often have been converted into small-claims tribunals. There is
little justification for making such a claim a federal case, requir-
ing a decision by a district court, an appeal as a matter of right to
a court of appeals, and potentially, consideration of a petition for
certiorari in this Court.2 °5
Justice Powell wound up, however, on the losing side of this question. A
majority of the Court ruled that section 1983 does not contain a state of
mind requirement: that the statute's remedies are not limited to intentional
deprivations of constitutional rights.2°1 One might have expected this con-
clusion to have come from the pen of Justice Brennan, but, oddly enough,
it was Justice Rehnquist who wrote for the majority-the same Justice
Rehnquist who fashioned Paul v. Davis out of a concern that the Court's
section 1983 decisions might otherwise "make of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment a font of tort law.",20 7 Obviously, Justice Rehnquist thought this dan-
203. 451 U.S. 527 (1981).
204. Id. at 546 (Powell, J., concurring).
205. Id. at 554-55 n.13.
206. Id. at 534.
207. Paul, 424 U.S. 693, 701 (1976).
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ger sufficiently averted by his further conclusion in Parratt that the state of
Nebraska had made available state remedies that were adequate to satisfy
the requirements of due process of law.2" 8 Powell, however, thought this
safety valve might not suffice to shut off a flood of potential section 1983
suits; he would prefer the more direct and certain barrier of precluding all
actions based on allegations of official negligence.20 9
The federal rights which may be vindicated by invoking section 1983 are
those, in the words of the statute, "secured by the Constitution and
laws."210 On the statute's face, the word "laws" is unqualified. Does this
mean that a claim based upon any federal statute may be the basis for a
section 1983 action?
One might suppose that the meaning of "laws" might be found in the
historical circumstances that gave rise to the enactment of the Civil Rights
Act of 1871-Congress' concern to protect the rights of the freedmen. It
has been commonly thought, therefore, that "laws" in section 1983 means
laws enacted to protect civil rights or rights of equality.
Support for this conclusion is found in the language of the jurisdictional
statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1343(a). That statute gives federal district courts juris-
diction over civil actions claiming a deprivation, under color of state law,
of rights secured by the Constitution "or by any Act of Congress providing
for equal rights." '' It also gives district courts jurisdiction over actions
seeking relief under "any Act of Congress providing for the protection of
civil rights, including the right to vote."
'2 12
Both section 1983 and section 1343(a) derive from section 1 of the Civil
Rights Act of 1871. When enacted, the statute only protected rights se-
cured "by the Constitution. 21 3 In 1874, the statute underwent a compre-
hensive revision, and section 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 was divided
into a remedial section and into two jurisdictional sections, one for district
courts and one for circuit courts. In the remedial statute, the phrase "se-
cured by the Constitution" (the language of the 1871 statute) became "se-
cured by the Constitution and laws.",214 Oddly enough, the wording of the
two jurisdictional sections varied. District courts were given jurisdiction
over actions brought to redress deprivations of rights secured by the Con-
208. 451 U.S. at 543-44.
209. Id. (Powell, J., concurring in the result).
210. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Supp. III 1979).
211. 28 U.S.C. § 1342(a)(3) (Supp. III 1979).
212. Id. § 1343(a)(4).
213. Act of Apr. 20, 1871, ch. 22, § 1, 17 Stat. 13 (1871).
214. 18 Stat. 347 (1874) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Supp. III 1979)).
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stitution or "by any law of the United States."2 5 The comparable phrase
in the statute conferring jurisdiction on the circuit courts was "by any law
providing for equal rights."2 6
In 1911, when the original jurisdiction of the circuit courts was abol-
ished, the Judicial Code of 1911 used the more restrictive language-laws
providing for "equal rights"-in describing the jurisdiction of the district
courts.2 17 This is the language of today's section 1343(a)(3).
In 1979, in Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Organization,218 the
Supreme Court held that section 1343 does not confer jurisdiction upon a
federal district court to hear claims based on the Social Security Act. The
Act is neither a statute securing "equal rights" within section 1343(a)(3)
nor a statute securing "civil rights" within section 1343(a)(4). 219 Justice
Stevens, writing for the majority, observed that the "Congress that enacted
section 1343(3) was primarily concerned with. . . cases dealing with racial
equality, [and] the Congress that enacted 1343(4) was primarily concerned
with . . . civil rights . . . notably the right to vote. ' 220 Justice Stevens
thought it "inappropriate to read the jurisdictional provisions to encom-
pass new claims which fall well outside the common understanding of
their terms.
221
After Chapman, the Supreme Court's decision in Maine v. Thiboutot
222
one year later is nothing short of remarkable. The case overturned the con-
ventional wisdom that "laws" in section 1983 means laws securing equal
rights. In Thiboutot, recipients of Aid to Families with Dependent Chil-
dren (AFDC) benefits invoked section 1983, claiming that state officials
had denied them benefits to which they were entitled under the Social Se-
curity Act. Justice Brennan concluded that the "plain language" of section
1983 ("and laws") permitted using section 1983 to bring a claim based on
the Social Security Act.
223
215. 18 Stat. 96 (1874) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1343(a)(3) (Supp. III 1979)).
See Act of Mar. 3, 1911, ch. 23, § 24(14), 36 Stat. 1087, 1092 (1911) (codified as amended at
28 U.S.C. § 1343(a)(3) (Supp. III 1979)), where Congress merged the jurisdiction of the cir-
cuit courts with that of the district courts.
216. 18 Stat. 112 (1874).
217. Act of Mar. 3, 1911, ch. 23, § 24(14), 36 Stat. 1087, 1092 (1911) (codified as amended
28 U.S.C. § 1343(a)(3) (Supp. Il 1979)).
218. 441 U.S. 600 (1979). See generally Note, Jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C § 1343 Does
Not Include Statutorily Based Claims of Welfare Rights Deprivation, 29 DEPAUL L. REV. 883
(1980).
219. 441 U.S. at 620.
220. Id. at 621.
221. Id.
222. 448 U.S. 1 (1980).
223. Id. at 4.
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Scanty as the legislative history of section 1983 is, one has to turn a blind
eye to the historical context which gave birth to the statute to conclude that
its reference to "and laws" is to be read without qualification. On the his-
torical evidence, Justice Powell, who dissented in Thiboutot, has by far the
better argument.224
The Court having ruled, however, the immediate question is: what will
be the effect of Thiboutot? How important a decision is it? What will be
the implications for the states and their officials now that section 1983 is to
be ead so broadly?
In his Thiboutot dissent, Justice Powell summed up the decision's practi-
cal effect: "that state and local governments, officers, and employees now
may face liability whenever a person believes he has been injured by the
administration of any federal-state cooperative program, whether or not
that program is related to equal or civil rights. '225 In an appendix to his
opinion, Justice Powell listed twenty-eight federal statutes-he called it a
"small sample" 226-that arguably could give rise to section 1983 actions
after Thiboutot.
His list included federal-state regulatory efforts (such as those involving
forest lands and water projects) and grant programs (such as welfare, un-
employment, and medical assistance programs). Altogether, Powell
thought that "literally hundreds" of cooperative regulatory and social wel-
fare laws might be the basis for section 1983 suits.
227
It is not inconceivable that Thiboutot might present a municipality with
a Catch-22 problem. Many of the actions taken by local government offi-
cials in administering a cooperative program are taken pursuant to federal
regulations. Federal officials, of course, cannot be sued under section
1983. Therefore, it is conceivable that, even though a federal agency had
issued directives which local officials felt obliged to follow, a court might
give damages against the locality in a section 1983 suit. However, the local
officials would have the benefit of a good faith defense, denied the local
government under Owen.228
It may be that Thiboutot's reach will not be limited to federal-state coop-
224. See 448 U.S. at 12-22 (Powell, J., dissenting). Justice Powell developed the histori-
cal record in greater detail in Chapman. See 441 U.S. at 623-44 (Powell, J., concurring).
225. 448 U.S. at 22 (Powell, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
226. Id. at 34.
227. Id. at 34-37. See Peters, supra note 172; The Supreme Court, 1979 Term, 94 HARV.
L. REV. 75, 223-231 (1980); Note; Maine P. hiboutot: Has the Supreme Court Opened the
Floodgatesfor Section 1983 Claims?, 20 J. FAM. L. 127 (1981).
228. Witnesses at the hearings on S. 584 gave, as examples, suits that might be brought
under the Clean Air Act or under the State and Local Fiscal Assistance Act of 1972. See
Municipal Liability Hearings, supra note 49, at 96-97 (statement of NIMLO).
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erative programs. Just as one can attack a state law on the ground that it
burdens a federal constitutional right (even though it does not by its terms
intend to do so), a plaintiff might argue that section 1983 gives relief
against a state action alleged to burden rights secured by a federal stat-
ute-any federal statute.229
In practical effect, Thiboutot's impact may be less dramatic than it seems
on its face in light of the ways litigants had succeeded even before
Thiboutot in bringing federal statutes unrelated to civil rights into a section
1983 action. It was not difficult for a plaintiffs lawyer to fashion a section
1983 complaint which contained, in addition to a statutory claim, an alle-
gation of the deprivation of a constitutional right (commonly an equal pro-
tection claim). Then, even if the constitutional claim was dropped from
the suit, the court could proceed by way of pendent jurisdiction to decide
the statutory claim.230
There is little doubt that, legislative history aside, the federal courts well
before Thiboutot had fallen increasingly into the practice of permitting sec-
tion 1983 actions to be brought to vindicate statutory claims. Even Justice
Powell admitted that there are Supreme Court decisions "premised upon
the assumption that § 1983 cover a broad range of federal statutory
claims."23' But, he submitted that the assumption had been made "uncrit-
ically ' 232 and that, until Chapman in 1979, no justice of the Court had
undertaken a close and thorough examination of the question, including
the legislative history.23 3 Indeed, in two recent cases, the Court reserved
the question decided in Thiboutot.2 34 Nevertheless, in assessing Thiboutot's
practical impact, it may be more a ratification of an evolving practice than
a green light for district courts to embark on an entirely new course. This
may be especially true in section 1983 actions brought to challenge state
interpretation of the Social Security Act, which had become common prac-
tice in the lower courts. 235 Viewed from this perspective, Thiboutot may be
important insofar as it resolves any doubt judges might have had about
permitting statutory claims to be based directly on section 1983 and, fur-
ther, insofar as it encourages litigants to look to yet other federal statutes
as a basis for section 1983 lawsuits--the fear voiced by Justice Powell.
229. See 448 U.S. at 22, 23 n. 12 (Powell, J., dissenting).
230. See, e.g., Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397 (1970).
231. Chapman, 441 U.S. at 644 (Powell, J., concurring).
232. Id.
233. Id.
234. See Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 405 n.5 (1979); Ha-
gans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 533 n.5 (1974).
235. Lower court cases are collected in the ACLU's amicus brief in Thiboutot at 33-36.
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Although Thiboutot gives new breadth to section 1983, it does not ex-
pand the jurisdiction of the federal courts. In its 1979 Chapman decision,
the Court held that the jurisdiction of the federal district courts under 28
U.S.C. §§ 1343(a)(3) and (4) does not encompass a claim that a state wel-
fare regulation is invalid because it conflicts with the Social Security
Act.236 Thiboutot permits such a claim to be brought under section 1983,
but it does not disturb the holding in Chapman. The result, of course, is an
anomaly: that the remedial section (1983) is read more broadly than the
jurisdictional sections.
As a result, claims of the Thiboutot type will be brought in state courts,
as was Thiboutot itself. Because the Supreme Court has never decided
whether state courts must hear section 1983 claims, that is an open ques-
tion. The Court has held, however, that state courts may hear such
cases. 237 Thiboutot may pose other concerns for the states, but, to the ex-
tent that it results in cases being brought in state rather than federal courts,
it does not give rise to the problems associated with federal court supervi-
sion of state programs and institutions.
It is states and localities, not the United States, which must worry about
the impact of Thiboutot. Section 1983 grants no right of action against the
United States. A federal statute may, of course, provide explicitly for pri-
vate actions to enforce the statute's terms; otherwise, the private litigant
must attempt to persuade a court to imply a private cause of action against
the government, with no help from section 1983.238
Even where the Court has already implied a cause of action under a
federal statute, or would be willing to do so, Thiboutot has particular im-
portance in making damages available as a remedy. It is one thing to
decide that a private party may invoke a federal statute as the basis for
injunctive relief, e.g., to demand admission to a university alleged to have
discriminated on the basis of sex. It is quite another thing to be able to
seek both injunctive relief and damages, as is possible under section 1983.
Because of Quern v. Jordan,239 states do not face retrospective damages
under section 1983 and at least have the comfort of being able to offer, as a
defense, that they acted in good faith. Municipalities, however, have par-
ticular reason to be concerned about the reach of the Supreme Court's
section 1983 decisions. Monell makes them liable for damages in a section
1983 suit, Thiboutot expands the categories of federal statutes which they
236. 441 U.S. at 620.
237. See Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277, 283-84 n.7 (1980).
238. See 448 U.S. at 23-24 (PowelL J., dissenting).
239. 440 U.S. 332 (1979).
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may be charged with violating, and Owen precludes their pleading the
good faith of their agents and employees as a defense.
Thiboutot is also important for its holding regarding the award of attor-
neys' fees. The Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976 permits a
court, in its discretion, to award reasonable attorney's fees as part of the
costs allowed the prevailing party.2" In Thiboutot, the Court ruled that
awards under the 1976 Act may be given to the prevailing party in a sec-
tion 1983 action.24'
For civil rights and other public interest lawyers, this aspect of Thiboutot
is of unquestioned importance. The concept of private citizens bringing
lawsuits as "private attorneys general" is now a familiar one. There is an
obvious public interest in the outcome of such litigation, and the public
interest bar has come to depend heavily on the award of fees in civil rights,
environmental, and other such litigation.242 In 1976, the Supreme Court
dealt a harsh blow to public interest lawyers when, in Aiyeska Pipeline
Service Co. v. Wilderness Society,243 it overturned a lower court's award of
attorneys' fees to the environmentalists who had prevailed in the litigation.
The Court reasoned that fees could not be awarded without statutory au-
thorization. 2 " Congress moved quickly to undo the damage wrought by
Alyeska, and the result was described as being a "fee-shifting mechanism"
aimed at enforcing federal law "by enlisting private citizens as law en-
forcement officials.,
245
With Thiboutot, the 1976 Act becomes all the more important, because
an award under the act may be made to the prevailing party in any section
1983 action-and Thiboutot holds that section 1983 may be used to bring a
claim based upon federal laws generally, not just those providing for equal
rights. The attorneys' fees aspect of Thiboutot is as important to states as
to municipalities. Even though Quern protects states as such from damage
awards in section 1983 actions, the Court held in Hutto v. Finney,246 that
when Congress passed the 1976 statute it "undoubtedly" intended to set
240. Pub. L. No. 94-559, codified in 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1976). See Comment, Attorney's
Fees in Damage Actions Under the Ciil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976, 47 U.
CHI. L. REV. 332 (1980), Note, Promoting the Vindication of Civil Rights through the Attor-
ney's Fees AwardsAct, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 346 (1980).
241. 448 U.S. at 9.
242. See Leventhal, Attorneys' Feesfor Public Interest Representation, 62 A.B.A.J. 1134
(1976); Nussbaum, Attorney's Fees in Public Interest Litigation, 48 N.Y.U. L. REV. 301
(1973).
243. 421 U.S. 240 (1975).
244. Id. at 271.
245. 122 CONG. REC. 33,314 (1976) (statement of Sen. Abourezk).
246. 437 U.S. 678 (1978).
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aside states' immunity from retroactive relief. Both the act's language and
its legislative history support the conclusion that the statute authorized
"fee awards payable by the States when their officials are sued in their
official capacities. 247 Moreover, an award of attorneys' fees under the
1976 Act requires no finding of bad faith on the part of the state
officials.248
Professor George D. Brown has suggested that the availability of attor-
neys' fees in grant litigation "may well be the most significant result of
Thiboutot.',249 The Washington State Attorney General believes that the
Civil Rights Attorneys' Fees Act costs the states and municipalities "more
money in attorneys' fees than § 1983 costs us in actual damages. 25 ° In
individual cases, the award of attorneys' fees can far outstrip the amount at
issue in the litigation.25" '
The question of standing-the ability of an individual plaintiff to base a
cause of action on a particular federal statute-may be important in testing
how far Thiboutot will reach. Congress may, of course, explicitly provide a
civil remedy.252 More often, however, a statute is silent on the question of
whether private parties have the right to seek enforcement of their rights in
court. In such a case, if a plaintiff cannot look to section 1983 as his pass-
port into court, he must hope that the court will be willing to imply a
private right of action from the statute.
The Supreme Court has charted an uneven course in responding to liti-
gants' efforts to have private causes of action implied from federal statutes.
Before the advent of the Warren Court, there was no consistent pattern of
support or opposition in this area. 53 In a 1964 case, 5 the Court handed
down a decision which marked the beginning of a decade characterized by
a greater willingness to imply a private right of action. 55
247. Id. at 693-94.
248. Id. at 699 n.32.
249. Municpal Liability Hearings, supra note 49, at 335-36 (statement of Prof. George D.
Brown).
250. Id. at 531 (statement of Kenneth 0. Eikenberry, representing the National Ass'n of
Attorneys General).
251. See, e.g., Copeland v. Marshall, 641 F.2d 880 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (en banc) (award of
$160,000 attorneys' fees for obtaining $33,000 backpay).
252. See, e.g., provisions for private actions under Titles II and VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5(O, (g) (1976).
253. For example, compare Virginia Ry. Co, v. System Fed'n No. 40 Ry. Employees, 300
U.S. 515 (1937) (implying a judicial remedy) with General Committee v. Southern Pac. Co.,
320 U.S. 338 (1943) (refusing to imply a private cause of action).
254. J.I. Case v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
255. See, e.g., Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U.S. 229 (1969); Allen v. State
Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544 (1969); Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
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In 1975, the Court in Cort v. Ash outlined a four part test to consider
when deciding whether to imply a private right of action.256 Since that
decision, the Court has followed a stricter approach to implying private
actions and has denied attempts to create them.257 Yet not every effort has
been rebuffed; in 1979, the Court was willing to imply a private right of
action from Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, thus permit-
ting a plaintiff to sue a medical school for denying her admission on the
basis of sex.25 In the several years since Cort v. Ash, it appears that the
lower courts, unlike the Supreme Court, have been fairly receptive to liti-
gants' attempts to imply a private cause of action from a variety of federal
statutes.259
One reading of Thiboutot would solve such plaintiffs' standing
problems. Under this analysis, a plaintiff would not need to explore Con-
gress' intent to create private rights of action under a given federal statute
nor otherwise satisfy Cart v. Ash. The expanded interpretation of section
1983 would bypass that problem nicely.
It may be, however, that the Court will use the principle of Cart v. Ash
to limit the impact of Thiboutot. If the Court wishes to avoid the open
invitation to section 1983 litigation described by Justice Powell in his
Thiboutot dissent, it could simply hold that, unless a private cause of ac-
tion can be implied under the statute sought to be vindicated, the plaintiff
lacks standing to invoke section 1983. This approach would provide a way
to distinguish between Social Security claims, where it is easier to conceive
an individual's right to sue, and joint federal-state regulatory programs,
where the notion of individual entitlement is less obvious. From a civil
rights lawyer's standpoint, however, this approach would make Thiboutot
something of a Barmecide feast-a great deal less than meets the eye.
In the October 1980 Term, it appeared that the justices would have occa-
sion to expand the reach of Thiboutot. The Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit had upheld a lower court's grant of relief to persons complaining of
conditions at a Pennsylvania state hospital for the mentally retarded.
260
Among other things, the Third Circuit, applying Cart v. Ash standards,
implied a private right of action for mentally retarded persons under the
256. 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975).
257. See, e.g., Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978); Piper v. Chris-Craft
Indus. Inc., 430 U.S. 1 (1977). In Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 698 (1979),
even while implying a private cause of action in that case, Justice Stevens characterized the
Court's post-Cori standard as a "strict" approach.
258. Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. at 680.
259. In his Cannon dissent, Justice Powell lists no fewer than 20 such opinions by courts
of appeals in the four years between Cori and Cannon. Id at 741-42 (Powell, J., dissenting).
260. Halderman v. Pennhurst State School & Hosp., 612 F.2d 84 (3d Cir. 1979).
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Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act of 1975.261
Because Thiboutot had been handed down after the petition for certiorari
had been filed in the Pennsylvania case, the Court, in granting certiorari in
the latter case, requested counsel to brief and argue an additional question:
"Does 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provide a private remedy to enforce the provisions
of the Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act
. .. .9262
The Supreme Court's ultimate decision in Pennhurst State School &
Hospital v. Haldermnan263 failed to supply the anticipated gloss on
Thiboutot. The Court reversed the Third Circuit, concluding that the 1975
statute did not create a substantive right in favor of the mentally retarded
to "appropriate treatment" in the "least restrictive" setting.2 4 Hence, the
Court had no need to reach the question of whether, there being such a
substantive right, there might be a private right of action under section
1983 to enforce it.
265
Pennhurst nevertheless sparked a debate among the justices revealing
their sharp differences on the reach of 7hiboutot. Counsel for the mentally
retarded patients in Pennhurst argued that they should be able to bring suit
to compel compliance with the requirements of the 1975 statute that each
state, as a condition of receiving federal funds under the act, furnish cer-
tain assurances to the Secretary of Health and Human Services. 266 This
issue was remanded for further consideration by the Third Circuit, but
Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, said that it was "at least an
open question" whether an individual's interest in having the state provide
those assurances is a "right secured" by laws of the United States within
the meaning of section 1983.267 Moreover, it was "unclear" whether the
express remedy contained in the 1975 Act--termination of funding by the
Federal Government in the event of state noncompliance with federally
imposed conditions-was exclusive.
268
Justice Rehnquist's Pennhurst opinion seems to contain clear hints that
he, for one, wishes to contain the expansive potential of Thiboutot. He
impliedly states that an individual's effort to enforce the statutory require-
ment of state assurances to the federal government does not rise to the
261. Id at 97-100.
262. Pennhurst Parents-Staff Ass'n v. Halderman, 447 U.S. 904 (1980).
263. 451 U.S. 1 (1981).
264. Id at 18.
265. Id at 28 n.21.
266. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 6011, 6063(b)(5)(C) (1976).




422 Catholic University Law Review [Vol. 31:375
level of the individual beneficiary's claim in Thiboutot that state law pre-
vented him from receiving federal funds to which he was entitled.269 Ad-
ditionally, Rehnquist's lightly veiled suggestion that the 1975 Act's
"express" remedy surely must be "exclusive" draws directly upon Justice
Powell's suggestion, in his Thiboutot dissent, that section 1983 would not
be available where the governing statute provides an exclusive remedy.
27 0
Some of the Rehnquist's colleagues were distinctly unsettled by his ef-
forts to curb Thiboutot's implicit ambit. Justice Blackmun, concurring in
Pennhurst, refused to join what he styled the "advisory" portion of Justice
Rehnquist's opinion.271 He was unhappy with the Court's appearing
"strongly to intimate that it will not view kindly any future positive hold-
ing" permitting private parties to enforce sections of the 1975 Act.272 Jus-
tice White, who, contrary to the majority, read the statute to create
substantive rights in behalf of the mentally retarded, made his understand-
ing of Thiboutot even more explicit: "In essence, Thiboutot creates a pre-
sumption that a federal statute creating federal rights may be enforced in a
§ 1983 action.
''271
The debate in Pennhurst suggests the lines along which future battles
over Thiboutot type issues will be fought. Some justices, like Brennan and
Marshall (who joined White's opinion in Pennhurst), will, in this context
and others, push for ready access by individuals to a federal remedy to
vindicate federal laws. Others, following the interpretation of Justices
Rehnquist and Powell that the Court has gone too far already, will seek
ways of checking section 1983. The rear guard action will be fought on at
least two fronts. One is to find that there is no "right" under federal law,
hence nothing to which section 1983 can be attached. The other is to read
a governing statute to provide an exclusive remedy, thus preempting a sec-
tion 1983 remedy.
Two months after Pennhurst, the Court decided Middlesex County Sew-
erage Authority v. National Sea Clammers Association .274 The Middlesex
case is a crisp example of using the "exclusive remedy" avenue to limit
section 1983 suits. Two federal statutes-the Federal Water Pollution
Control Act and the Marine Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries Act-
expressly authorize private persons to bring citizen suits to enjoin statutory
269. Id
270. Id
271. Id at 32 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment).
272. Id
273. Id at 51 (White, J., dissenting in part).
274. 101 S. Ct. 2615 (1981).
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violations.275 In Middlesex, Justice Powell, writing for the majority, held
that those statutes do not implicitly create a private right of action for
damages or for injunctive relief in addition to the statutes' express reme-
dies. 276 As to the private parties' efforts to invoke section 1983, Powell
concluded that the two acts' comprehensive enforcement mechanisms sup-
planted remedies otherwise available under section 1983.277
The water pollution and marine protection statutes at issue in Middlesex
did not explicitly rule out recourse to section 1983 remedies. Justice Pow-
ell reached his conclusion about the exclusivity of the two statutes' reme-
dies by fashioning a rule that "[wihen the remedial devices provided in a
particular act are sufficiently comprehensive, they may suffice to demon-
strate congressional intent to preclude the remedy of suits under
§ 1983. "278 Upon examining the two governing statutes in Middlesex, Jus-
tice Powell found it "hard to believe that Congress intended to preserve
the § 1983 right of action when it created so many specific statutory reme-
dies"'279 in those statutes.
The importance of Middlesex as a sequel to Thiboutot and Pennhurst
lies, among other things, in emphasizing how much turns on where one
perceives the status quo: Does one presume section 1983 relief to be avail-
able unless a convincing case is made that Congress intended the remedies
in another statute to be exclusive, or does one presume that Congress, hav-
ing passed another statute, intended to supplant the section 1983 remedy?
The issue may be decided according to who has the burden of proof. In
Middlesex, Justice Stevens, who dissented in part, complained that the ma-
jority was putting the burden on the section 1983 plaintiff to show Con-
gress' explicit intention to permit violations of the substantive statute to be
redressed by way of section 1983. Stevens thought the burden should be
"on the defendant to show that Congress intended to foreclose access to
the § 1983 remedy as a means of enforcing the substantive statute." 280 In
short, for Stevens, a section 1983 remedy should be the norm, with the
burden upon the defendant to show otherwise.
Justice Stevens' interpretation notwithstanding, Justice Powell's opinion
does not in fact put the burden on the plaintiff to show that Congress in-
275. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1976 & Supp. III 1979); 33 U.S.C. §§ 1401-1444 (1976 &
Supp. III 1979).
276. 101 S. Ct. at 2625.
277. Id. at 2627.
278. Id. at 2626.
279. Id
280. Id. at 2630 n.j 1 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in
part).
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tended, in enacting a substantive statute, to preserve recourse to section
1983. Justice Powell's conclusion of exclusivity in Middlesex turns on his
view of the comprehensive nature of the remedies provided in the water
pollution and marine protection statutes. Implicit in the opinion is the
requirement that a section 1983 defendant demonstrate sufficient compre-
hensiveness for the Court to conclude that Congress intended an exclusive
remedy. Burden of proof language aside, however, there is a difference of
temperament in these two interpretations of section 1983 opinions. At the
outset of Justice Stevens' opinion, there is the telling declaration that it is
"the business of courts to fashion remedies for wrongs."28 Obviously, he
will resolve doubts about access to section 1983-and about implying a
private fight of action from federal statutes in general-in favor of permit-
ting the private action. Justice Powell, the dissenter in Thiboutot, is more
reluctant about permitting such easy access to the courts. He does not
deny Congress' power to create remedies, through section 1983 or other-
wise, but he is inclined to resolve doubts against private actions.
The course of the Court's post-Thiboutot decisions is likely to be as un-
certain and episodic as its case-by-case determination as to whether private
rights of action may be implied from federal statutes generally. The re-
sults in given cases will turn heavily upon underlying philosophies about
the desirability of easy access to court-Justice Brennan's liberality with
Justice Powell's caution-and upon presumptions indulged, such as by
White in Pennhurst, as to whether the ability to invoke section 1983 should
be taken as the norm.
These musings on Thiboutot and its sequels become academic if Con-
gress enacts Senator Hatch's S. 584. That bill would strike at the heart of
the controversy by deleting section 1983's reference to "and laws" and sub-
stituting "and by any law providing for equal rights of citizens or of all
persons within the jurisdiction .of the United States." '28 2 An ACLU critic
of S. 584 has argued that Middlesex has in effect done most of what the bill
would do: that Middlesex cuts back so sharply on Thiboutot that the ear-
lier case's effect "is really in a very limited area and may be limited to
Social Security Act cases alone., 28  One understands, from the standpoint
of tactics, why this argument would be advanced as part of an effort to
head off S 584's passage. But one suspects that most people reading Mid-
dlesex and the other relevant cases in this area would find the question of
Thiboutot's present meaning far from clearly resolved.
281. Id at 2628.
282. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
283. Municipal Liability Hearings, supra note 49, at 405 (statement of Prof. Leon
Friedman).
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VI. SYSTEMATIC RELIEF
Public law litigation has increasingly taken on a systematic character.
The paradigm lawsuit over constitutional issues today is not the action by
a lone individual for damages; it is the class action seeking injunctive relief
to significantly alter the way government carries out some function. The
model was set in the school desegregation cases where federal courts un-
dertook the job of redesigning school systems. The example set by the
school cases soon spread to cases in which litigants were asking courts to
reapportion legislatures, reform jails and prisons, clean up mental hospi-
tals, oversee police departments, and make policy for various other state
and local functions.
In 1908, the first Justice Harlan, dissenting in Exparte Young,284 feared
a "radical change in our governmental system," in which federal courts
would "supervise and control the official action of the States as if they
were 'dependencies' or provinces."2 5 Perhaps Justice Harlan had been
reading Jules Verne. Today, federal judges act as school superintendents,
prison wardens, and superintendents of state hospitals. In Boston, because
of the local school committee's resistance to desegregation orders, Judge
Garrity finally took the step of placing South Boston High School under
federal court receivership.286 The battles between Judge Frank M. John-
son, Jr., and officials in Alabama are legendary. His decision in Wyatt v.
Stickney, 287 ordering reforms in Alabama's mental hospitals, is a well-
known example of the new brand of institutional litigation.
It is not hard to understand how judges get drawn into presiding over
systematic reform of a state institution. Frequently, the conditions com-
plained of, as in the mental hospital cases, are wretched in the extreme.
Moreover, local leadership, as in the Boston case, may be bitterly opposed
284. Exparte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
285. Id at 175 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
286. Morgan v. Kerrigan, 409 F. Supp. 1141 (D. Mass. 1975), a f'd sub nor. Morgan v.
McDonough, 540 F.2d 527 (1st Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1042 (1977). This was one in
a series of orders in the Boston school desegregation controversy. See Developments in the
Law, Section 1983 and Federalism, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1133, 1236-39 (1977). See also Roberts,
The Extent of Federal Judicial Equitable Power: Receivership of South Boston High School,
12 NEw ENG. L. REV. 55 (1976); Roberts, The Supreme Court Gambles in Allowing the Con-
tinuation ofFederal Court Control Over a Local High School, 12 NEW ENG. L. REv. 577
(1977).
287. See Wyatt v. Stickney, 325 F. Supp. 781 (M.D. Ala.),further hearing, 334 F. Supp.
1341 (M.D. Ala. 1971), enforced, 344 F. Supp. 373 (M.D. Ala.); 344 F. Supp. 387 (M.D.
Ala.), aff'd sub nom. Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974) (affirmed in part;
remanded in part and decision reserved in part). See Note, The Wyatt Case.: Implementation
ofa Judicial Decree Ordering Institutional Change, 84 YALE L.J. 1338 (1975). On Judge
Johnson, see R. KENNEDY, JR., JUDGE FRANK M. JOHNSON, JR. (1978).
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to the court's intervention and do all it can to frustrate the court's rulings,
leading the judge to displace the state or local body and lay down the
details of change himself.
Professor Abram Chayes has described this "public law model" of
litigation:
The traditional adversary relationship is suffused and intermixed
with negotiating and mediating processes at every point. The
judge is the dominant figure in organizing and guiding the case,
and he draws for support not only on the parties and their coun-
sel, but on a wide range of outsiders-masters, experts, and over-
sight personnel. Most important, the trial judge has increasingly
become the creator and manager of complex forms of ongoing
relief, which have widespread effects on persons not before this
court and require the judge's continuing involvement in adminis-
tration and implementation.28 s
Sweeping use of federal equity power has obvious implications for fed-
eralism. When a judge undertakes systematic relief, he displaces the
elected and appointed officials who normally supervise the state or local
function that is the object of that litigation. Systematic relief typically goes
beyond the traditional negative prohibition of telling an official not to do
something and imposes affirmative obligations upon state or local officials.
There is a genuine danger of a judge's "tunnel vision"; concerned with the
problem placed before him in the particular lawsuit, for example,
appalling conditions in a mental hospital, he has no occasion to be con-
cerned about the impact of his ruling on limited state or local financial
resources. Understandably, the judge is likely to say that constitutional
rights cannot be denied by an appeal to budget difficulties. 2 9 As a result,
public resources may fund a function or service which is the subject of
litigation at the expense of other valuable services not before the court.
This is not intended to insinuate that a judge does not act out of felt neces-
sity and on the basis of a demonstrated need, but it does call attention to
the extent to which systematic reforms, undertaken through the federal
courts' equity powers, displace the normal democratic and political
process.
290
288. Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARv. L. REV. 1281,
1284 (1976).
289. See, e.g., Rhem v. Malcolm, 527 F.2d 1041 (2d Cir. 1975) (per curiam): "More im-
portantly, an individual's constitutional rights may not be sacrificed on the ground that the
city has other and more pressing priorities." Id. at 1043-44.
290. There is a growing body of literature on the implications of institutional litigation.
A selective list would include D. HOROWITZ, THE COURTS AND SOCIAL POLICY (1977);
Chayes, supra note 288; Eisenberg & Yeazell, The Ordinary and the Extraordinary in Insittu-
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There are signs that at least some of the justices on the Burger Court are
concerned about the activist role of federal courts in undertaking supervi-
sion of state and local functions. This concern is manifested in Rizzo v.
Goode.29" ' Alleging police abuses against minority citizens, the plaintiffs in
Rizzo brought a class action seeking broad injunctive relief against Phila-
delphia's mayor and commissioner of police. The district judge found nu-
merous violations of citizens' rights and ordered the defendants to submit
a plan for handling citizens' complaints and revising police training
procedures.292
The Supreme Court reversed. As Justice Rehnquist framed the question
which the case raised: "We granted certiorari to consider petitioner's
claims that the judgment of the District Court represents an unwarranted
intrusion by the federal judiciary into the discretionary authority commit-
ted to them by state and local law to perform their official functions.293
Justice Rehnquist based his conclusion that injunctive relief was unwar-
ranted on several factors, among them that the record did not show a per-
vasive pattern of discriminatory acts by police officers.2 94 Federalism was
another factor, and he emphasized that the principles of federalism gov-
erning the relationship between federal courts and state governments
might have their greatest force where injunctive relief is sought against
pending state criminal proceedings295 (the Younger line of cases discussed
above). He found those principles also applicable, however, where relief is
sought against an official of a state or local government.296
For those who look to federal courts as primary forums for the enforce-
ment of federal rights, Rizzo was an unwelcome decision. Archibald Cox
thought that Rizzo gave "extraordinary weight" to official action and that
its approach reflected too rigid a barrier against the effective protection of
tional Litigation, 93 HARV. L. REV. 465 (1980); Frug, The Judicial Power of the Purse, 126 U.
PA. L. REV. 715 (1978); Mishkin, Federal Courts as State Reformers, 35 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 949 (1978); Nagel, Separation of Powers and the Scope of Federal Equitable Remedies,
30 STAN. L. REV. 661 (1978); Symposium, Judicially Managed Institutional Reform, 32 ALA.
L. REV. 267 (1981). The Alabama symposium includes an article by Judge Frank M. John-
son, Jr., perhaps the best known of all federal judges for his institutional reform decrees.
See Johnson, The Role of Federal Courts in Institutional Litigation, 32 ALA. L. REV. 271
(1981).
291. 423 U.S. 362 (1976).
292. 357 F. Supp. 1289 (E.D. Pa. 1973).
293. 423 U.S. at 366.
294. Id at 375.
295. Id at 379.
296. Id For a critical review of Rizzo, see Weinberg, The New Judicial Federalism, 29
STAN. L. REV. 1191 (1977).
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constitutional rights.297
Rizzo represents the Court's groping for some way to accommodate the
two interests which furnish the central theme of this paper: federalism,
particularly a concern for local control of local institutions, and individual
rights, including the principle of a federal forum for the vindication of
federal rights. Because several factors formed the foundation for Justice
Rehnquist's opinion, however, it is difficult to measure what applications
the decision may have in other contexts. Some observers have suggested
that, in fact, Rizzo is not likely to foreshadow a significant curtailing of
institutional litigation in the federal courts.298
One reason why Rizzo seems not to have spawned a string of sequels is
that, except in the area of school desegregation, the Supreme Court has not
been notably active in reviewing lower court decisions undertaking institu-
tional reforms. Moreover, concerning the school cases, the Court's deci-
sions have been marked by a largely generous attitude toward federal
courts' equity powers. For a time, beginning about 1976, it appeared as if
the Court would begin to rein in the lower courts in desegregation cases.
For example, in a case from Pasadena, California, the Court overruled a
federal judge who had ordered annual reassignment of students so that
there would never be a majority of minority students in any of the city's
schools.299 In other cases, the Court has drawn a line between de facto and
de jure segregation, requiring that remedial decrees turn on a de jureshowing. 3°°
Two 1979 cases, however, suggest a permissive attitude to lower court
findings offered in support of system-wide desegregation orders. Review-
ing cases from Columbus and Dayton, Ohio, the Court upheld comprehen-
sive orders in a way that reflected a far greater tolerance for the fashioning
of systematic relief than the Court showed in Rizzo.3° Justice Rehnquist,
dissenting in the Columbus case, said that the remedy affirmed in that case
was "as complete and dramatic a displacement of local authority by the
federal judiciary as is possible in our federal system" 3° 2-the reassignment
of 42,000 of the system's 96,000 students along with the reassignment of
297. Cox, Federalism and Individual Rights under the Burger Court, 73 Nw. U.L. REV. 1,
18 (1978).
298. See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §§ 3-41, at 154-56 (1978). See also
Eisenberg & Yeazell, supra note 290, at 504-05.
299. Pasadena City Bd. of Educ. v. Spangler, 427 U.S. 424 (1976).
300. See Austin Indep. School Dist. v. United States, 429 U.S. 990 (1976); Dayton Bd. of
Educ. v. Brinkman, 433 U.S. 406 (1977).
301. See Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449 (1979); Dayton Bd. of Educ. v.
Brinkman, 443 U.S. 526 (1979).
302. 443 U.S. at 489 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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teachers and administrators, a complete reorganization of the grade
schools, the closing of thirty-three schools, and increased busing of 37,000
students. Justice Powell, also a dissenter, complained that "the federal
judiciary should be limiting rather than expanding the extent to which
courts are operating the public school systems of our country.
30 3
A striking example of the Court's tolerance in permitting federal courts
to exercise their equity powers in school cases, where there is sufficient
basis for a finding of de jure segregation, is found in the Court's 1977 deci-
sion in Milliken v. Bradley.3°4 In Milliken 1,305 the Court had ruled, in a
five to four decision, that a federal judge had exceeded his powers by or-
dering that Detroit's schools, heavily black, be combined with the sur-
rounding suburban districts, which were predominantly white. There
being no basis for a finding of constitutional violations in the suburban
districts, the judge could not include them in his order.
Milliken I turns on the principle that the scope of the remedy must be
determined by the scope of the violation. But once a violation has been
proven, Milliken II shows how sweeping the federal court's remedial pow-
ers can be. In Milliken HI, the Court upheld the district court's ordering
compensatory or remedial education programs for Detroit school children
who had been subjected to past acts of de jure segregation. Moreover,
rejecting arguments based on the eleventh amendment, the Court ap-
proved the lower court's requiring the state of Michigan to pay about half
the additional cost of those programs-almost $6 million from the state.
Milliken II demonstrates that federal injunctive relief can not only be
comprehensive, but expensive as well.
In short, Burger Court opinions, especially Rizzo and some of the school
desegregation cases, reflect a restlessness about the sweep of federal court
injunctive power, especially where it is used to undertake systematic re-
form of state and local institutions. In those opinions, federalism becomes
a factor to weigh in reviewing the legitimacy and propriety of remedies
ordered by lower courts. Yet, when one looks at the overall thrust of Bur-
ger Court opinions, it is difficult to conclude that the federal courts have
been swayed in any fundamental way from their pattern in exercising eq-
307uity powers.
303. Id (Powell, J., dissenting).
304. 443 U.S. 267 (1977).
305. 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
306. See 433 U.S. at 292-93 (Powell, J., concurring).
307. For a fuller discussion, see Howard, The Supreme Court and Federalism in THE
COURTS: THE PENDULUM OF FEDERALISM 49 (Annual Report of Chief Justice Earl Warren
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VII. FEDERALISM AND THE SUPREME COURT
In tracing the Supreme Court's interpretations of the civil rights statutes,
one finds the Court constantly making judgments about federalism. Like
other constitutional values, federalism is not a static concept. The framers
of the Constitution brought their ideas about the federal system to bear on
their work, and subsequent generations have added insights drawn from
the evolving nature of American society. Yet, for all the changes that two
hundred years have brought, federalism remains one of the important
forces in constitutional interpretation.
Interpreting section 1983 and other civil rights statutes is just one of the
ways in which the Supreme Court makes judgments about federalism.
Other examples include the following:
1. Imposing national standards. The Warren Court succeeded in using
the fourteenth amendment to apply nearly all the requirements of the Bill
of Rights to the states.3 °8 On the present Court, Justice Powell has ques-
tioned whether such "jot for jot and case for case" application of federal
standards to state criminal procedures does not derogate principles of fed-
eralism and deprive the states of the opportunity to experiment with useful
innovations.30 9 A majority of the court, however, has stood by the stan-
dards of "incorporation" laid down by the Warren Court.
In obscenity cases, by contrast, the Burger Court has rejected the notion
of a national standard. The Court has ruled that "community standards"
applied by juries in obscenity cases need not be national standards. Chief
Justice Burger does not interpret the first amendment "as requiring that
the people of Maine or Mississippi accept public depiction of conduct
found tolerable in Las Vegas or New York City."
310
2. Reviewing state criminal convictions. A constant on the Supreme
Court's docket is the review of state criminal cases. One way in which the
Court can give the states more breathing room is to relax the substantive
standards that apply in those cases. Much has been written about whether
the Burger Court is more "conservative" than was the Warren Court, 3"
and the record on this score is a mixed one. The Court has moved in new
Conference on Advocacy in the United States, Roscoe Pound-American Trial Lawyers
Foundation; Wash. D.C., 1979).
308. See, e.g., Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968) (jury trial in criminal cases);
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (right to counsel).
309. Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 375-76, 404 (1972) (Powell, J., concurring) (quoting
Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 181 (1968) (Harlan, J., dissenting)).
310. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 32 (1973).
311. See Howard, The Burger Court.- A Judicial Nonet Plays the Enigma Variations, 43
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBs. 7 (Summer 1980).
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directions since the departure of Earl Warren, and this is especially obvi-
ous in criminal law. Much of the change can be attributed to a greater
sensitivity to the needs of law enforcement, but a concern for federalism is
an additional factor.
Substantive standards aside, the Court can also make institutional judg-
ments, grounded in considerations of federalism, about the relationship
between state and federal courts. The Warren Court made it much easier
for state prisoners to use federal habeas corpus to collaterally attack their
state convictions in federal courts." 2 Justice Powell argued in 1973 that
the Supreme Court had gone too far: "In my view, this Court has few
more pressing responsibilities than to restore the mutual respect and bal-
anced sharing of responsibility between the state and federal courts which
our tradition and the Constitution itself so wisely contemplate. 3  In 1976,
the Court moved in Justice Powell's direction by holding that federal
habeas corpus is not available to review a state prisoner's fourth amend-
ment claim where there has been a full and fair opportunity to adjudicate
that claim in the state courts.
3 1 4
3. Reconciling state and federal law. The Constitution spells out the
respective competence of the states and the federal government in very
general terms; therefore, the Supreme Court is regularly called upon to act
as an arbiter of the federal system. One of the Court's roles is to see that
state measures do not unduly impinge on federal interests. Sometimes, a
state law is invalidated because it conflicts with a federal statute: the doc-
trine of federal preemption. In other cases, a state's action may be found
to burden or impinge upon a national interest, such as free flow of com-
merce, even though Congress has not acted.
The Court's readiness to strike down a state law for conflicting with a
federal statute or impinging upon a national interest is the subject of ongo-
ing debate among the jsutice. Justice Black complained that his brethren
acted as a "super-legislature" in reviewing the merits of state laws that
allegedly burdened interstate commerce.31 5 In fact, whether one looks at
the cases in which state law is measured against national statutes or regula-
tions, or at cases in which state acts are weighed against the Constitution
itself, such as the commerce clause, it is hard to trace any consistent course
in the Court's opinions. Some decisions seem to lean toward state inter-
ests, for example, Chief Justice Burger's opinion upholding the states'
power to prohibit record piracy and concluding that neither the Constitu-
312. See, e.g., Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
313. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 265 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring).
314. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
315. Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 788 (1945) (Black, J., dissenting).
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tion's copyright clause nor federal law preempted the state law.31 6 Other
cases give preference to national interests, such as the holding that the
Federal Aviation Act preempted a locality's ordinance regulating the
hours of a jet takeoff at a local airport." 7
4. Limiting nationalpower. Symmetry would suggest that a Court able
to protect national interests from impingement by the states would also
protect the states' interests from invasion by the federal government. Dur-
ing the early period of this century, just such a notion of "dual federalism"
permeated the Court's opinions. In the famous Child Labor Case,3"' the
Court struck down a federal statute banning the interstate shipment of
goods produced by child labor. The Constitution's grant of the power to
regulate commerce to Congress did not, the Court held, include the au-
thority to "control the States in their exercise of the police power over local
trade and manufacture.
319
This constricted reading of the commerce clause died with the constitu-
tional revolution of 1937. After initial skirmishes over the New Deal,
which provoked President Roosevelt's famous "Court-packing" plan, the
justices retreated. In modem times, generations of law students have been
taught that there appeared to be no limits to Congress' commerce power-
certainly none that the Court would declare.
This was the understanding of the commerce power until the Court's
decision in National League of Cities v. Usery -in 1976.320 Conventional
wisdom about the Court and the commerce clause was confounded when a
majority of five justices ruled that Congress had exceeded its constitutional
authority by subjecting state and local government employees to federal
minimum wage and maximum hour requirements. Justice Rehnquist's ra-
tionale was that the federal law displaced the states' freedom to structure
"traditional government functions" and that, therefore, it interfered with
functions essential to the states' "separate and independent existence." 32 '
National League of Cities is the first case since 1937 in which the Court
has used the concept of federalism to limit Congress' commerce power.
The decision does not question Congress' power to regulateprivate activi-
ties,3 22 as settled in post-1937 cases, but where Congress seeks to place
316. Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 571 (1973).
317. City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., 411 U.S. 624 (1973).
318. Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918).
319. Id at 273-74.
320. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
321. Id at 851-52.
322. The Court's narrow holding only considers the impact of the federal law or the
"traditional governmental functions" of the state, not whether the law could be applied to
private individuals. See id at 852.
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mandates directly upon states as states, National League of Cities reveals
that the tenth amendment has not, as many had thought, been stripped of
all meaning.
The importance of National League of Cities is unclear. As an interpre-
tation of Congress' Article I powers, the decision's rationale does not carry
over to cases involving statutes based upon Congress' power under section
5 of the fourteenth amendment-an amendment whose substantive provi-
sions expressly operate upon the states.323 Even so, a decision by only a
one-vote margin, with no solid majority on any one theory of the case, may
be an unstable precedent. The six years since its pronouncement have ad-
ded little gloss to National League of Cities, at least in the Supreme
Court.324 In 1981, the Court reversed a district court's ruling that the Sur-
face Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977 violated the tenth
amendment by interfering with the states' traditional governmental func-
tion of regulating land use. In so doing, the Court wrote a decision seem-
ing to lay down a rather narrow reading of National League of Cities.325
National League of Cities does, nevertheless, stir the coals of the debate
323. Id
324. A challenge in the Supreme Court to EPA regulations commandeering state legisla-
tive processes by requiring the states to enact vehicle inspection and emission monitoring
controls was aborted when EPA's administrator conceded that he lacked statutory authority
to promulgate the regulations. See Maryland v. EPA, 530 F.2d 215 (4th Cir. 1977); District
of Columbia v. Train, 521 F.2d 971 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Brown v. EPA, 521 F.2d 827 (9th Cir.
1975); Arizona v. EPA, 521 F.2d 825 (9th Cir. 1975), all vacated and remanded sub nom. EPA
v. Brown, 431 U.S. 99 (1977).
325. Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining and Reclamation Ass'n, 101 S. Ct. 2352 (1981).
Justice Marshall said that, for a claim based on National League of Cities to succeed, each of
three distinct requirements must be satisfied: (1) that the challenged statute regulates the
"States as States," (2) that the federal regulation addresses matters that are indisputably
"attributes of state sovereignty," and (3) "that the States' compliance with the federal law
would directly impair their ability 'to structure integral operations in areas of traditional
functions."' Id at 2366. Going even further, Justice Marshall added, in a footnote, that even
if the three requirements are satisfied, the federal interest involved may be sufficient to over-
come the tenth amendment objection. Id at 4660 n.29 (citing Fry v. United States, 421 U.S.
542 (1975), and Justice Blackmun's concurrence in National League of Cities, 426 U.S. at
856).
In January 1982, the Court heard oral argument in two cases raising National League of
Cities-type issues. In United Transp. Union v. Long Island R.R., 50 U.S.L.W. 4315 (Mar.
24, 1982) (No. 80-1925), the Court heard arguments in reviewing a decision of the Second
Circuit, 634 F.2d 19 (2d Cir. 1980), that the Federal Railway Labor Act (which permits
strikes) violates New York's Taylor Act (which prohibits strikes by public employees), as
applied to the state-owned Long Island Railroad. In Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n v.
Mississippi (No. 80-1749), the Court reviewed a decision by federal district judge Harold
Cox, 49 U.S.L.W. 2553 (D. Miss. 1981), invalidating as "a clear usurpation of power" a
provision of the Public Utilities Regulatory Policies Act of 1978 requiring state utility com-
missions to oblige utility companies to deal on fair terms with producers of small and non-
traditional power sources.
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over what role, if any, the Supreme Court ought to play in limiting na-
tional powers in the name of federalism. Some academicians have argued
that the Court should stay out of this business: that states ought to look to
the political process if they want protection from national power.3 26 Na-
tional League of Cities tells us that, for the present at least, the Court
thinks it does have a legitimate role in this aspect of balancing state and
federal interests.
VIII. REPRESENTING THE STATES' INTERESTS BEFORE THE SUPREME
COURT
Those who care about the health and vitality of American federalism
know that what happens in Washington is as important to the states' inter-
sets as what happens in the state capitals. With the growth of national
power in recent decades, this truth is most evident in legislative corridors
and presidential councils. Perhaps the recitation of events described in this
article will make it evident that what the Supreme Court does has just as
much bearing on the states and their business as anything done by the
nation's executive and legislative branches.
The greater pity is that, with so much at stake, the states may well fare
the poorest of any class of litigants when it comes to getting their interests
fully and adequately represented in the work of the Supreme Court. Sev-
eral factors are involved.
1. The quality of briefs and arguments by those who argue a state's
case before the Supreme Court is too often inadequate. This is a judgment
one often hears from those who are the most intimately familiar with
Supreme Court practice. Justice Powell, in a speech to the Fifth Circuit
Judicial Conference, lamented that some of the "weakest briefs and argu-
ments" come from the state's lawyer-frequently an assistant from the at-
torney general's office.
3 27
Sometimes, of course, the state's case is superbly argued. Slade Gordon,
former Attorney General for the State of Washington, has appeared four-
teen times in the Supreme Court, and he is generally thought to be an
outstanding advocate. A legal newspaper commented that Virginia's At-
torney General, Marshall Coleman, was "well prepared and articulate" in
326. See Choper, The Scope of National Power Vis-a- Vis the States. The Dispensability of
Judicial Review, 86 YALE L.J. 1552 (1977); Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism."
The Role of the States in the Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54
COLUM. L. REV. 543 (1954). For a contrary view, see Howard, The Supreme Court and Fed-
eralism, supra note 307, at 66-7 1.
327. Address before Fifth Circuit Judicial Conference 3 (May 27, 1974).
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arguing the recent Consumers Union case before the Supreme Court.32 8
The same paper complimented an associate city counselor for his "sophis-
ticated and notably competent" argument in Owen .329 But, by and large,
the states do not fare as well in the Supreme Court as they should.
2. Supreme Court advocacy, especially where complicated constitu-
tional issues are involved, calls for unusual skills. In the early decades of
the nineteenth century, there was a specialized Supreme Court bar where a
small number of lawyers, like Daniel Webster, appeared with regularity
before the Court. Today, Chief Justice Burger estimates that two-thirds of
the lawyers who appear before the Court have never argued there
before.33' A constitutional argument is not like a nickel-and-dime case in
the small claims court. The Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental
Relations has commented that "virtually none" of the state and local gov-
ernments "possess the highly specialized legal expertise for Constitutional
tests."33'
3. Cost is a factor. Carrying a case to the Supreme Court can be an
expensive undertaking. The states might well have adequate resources col-
lectively to see that the best representation is had, but a single state or
locality may not. As the Advisory Commission has noted, "[t]oo many
state and local governments simply lack the financial capacity to pursue
expensive litigation, sometimes to the highest level, where the costs are
likely to run into the hundreds of thousands of dollars. 33 2
4. Another disadvantage suffered by the states in the Supreme Court is
that, in a case involving important issues of public policy, they are likely to
oppose the best lawyers from the private bar. Public interest groups in-
volved in such litigation realize the impact that one precedent-setting
Supreme Court decision can have and are likely to marshal their resources
accordingly.
5. Sometimes the state that is a nominal party to a case lacks any real
interest in seeing the adversary positions fully developed. In one argument
before the Supreme Court, a deputy attorney general conceded the uncon-
stitutionality of the state statute being challenged. During colloquy be-
tween counsel and the bench, several justices admitted their confusion
about the lawyer's conception of his role before the Court. Justice Stewart
commented that, at the national level, he understood it to be the obligation
328. The American Lawyer, April 1980, at 38.
329. The American Lawyer, March 1980, at 35.
330. The Special Skills ofAdvocacy 7 n.7 (John F. Sennett Memorial Lecture, Fordham
University Law School, Nov. 26, 1973).
331. ACIR, Docket Book, 70th Meeting 126 (June 19-20, 1980).
332. Id.
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of the Attorney General to defend the constitutionality of a statute enacted
by Congress, and yet this was the third time that this state's lawyer had
come before the Court and confessed the unconstitutionality of a
statute.333
One federal court of appeals judge has commented that "state's attor-
neys have abandoned adversary roles so often that there is at least grounds
to suspect that some litigation has been brought on feigned issues."'334 He
wondered whether state officials were not "'copping out,' ducking the hard
questions themselves, and relying on the federal judiciary to make tough,
unpopular decisions., 335 There is no doubt that most cases are vigorously
defended on the state's behalf, but the thought that at least some cases are
defended only halfbeartedly or may not be truly adversary is worth
pondering. If the interests of a private party were at stake, there would be
less occasion for concern, but where decisions are being shaped affecting
the interests of states other than the one at bar, it is important that every
legitimate dimension of the controversy be fully and carefully presented.
6. There appears to be little formal coordination among the states in
monitoring and being heard in Supreme Court litigation. Federal interests
are well represented, whether the United States is a party to a Supreme
Court case or not; the Solicitor General's office follows the Court's calen-
dar with great care. Amicus briefs filed by the Solicitor General are often
influential in shaping the issues in a case.
One attorney general indicated that when an attorney general thinks a
case is important enough to attract the interest of other states, he simply
writes a letter to the attorneys general of the other states, asking whether
they would like to join the brief he is filing in the Supreme Court. There
seems to be no formal mechanism at the state level for the kind of system-
atic representation which the more active public interest groups achieve in
the processes of the Court.
The result is the lack of any "early warning system" by which the states
can identify cases coming to the Court's docket and decide which ones are
likely to have particular impact on the interests of the states. If such a
system existed, the states could decide whether to seek leave to file an ami-
cus brief. As Justice Powell has commented, "[o]ften the import of these
cases apparently is not identified in time or possibly not even compre-
hended by state authorities or by some of the private interest groups
333. 12 CRIM L. REP. (BNA) 4111 (Dec. 13, 1972), reporting colloquy in Goosby v.
Osser, 409 U.S. 512 (1973).
334. Aldisert, supra note 115, at 562.
335. Id
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affected." '336
In pointing to the weakness in the representation of the states' interests
before the Supreme Court, I am not arguing that any particular case that a
state has lost before that tribunal ought to have been decided the other
way. Many decisions against particular states have brought essential re-
forms, for example, in the administration of criminal justice. Surely the
Court was right to declare that a criminal defendant too poor to hire a
lawyer is entitled to have one appointed for him. Gideon v. Wainwright337
ought not to have been decided differently, no matter how brilliant the
argument on the state's side. I do not suppose, therefore, that had the level
of briefs and arguments submitted by the states in modem Supreme Court
cases been uniformly outstanding, the main course of constitutional devel-
opment would have been markedly different. I do urge that, with high
quality advocacy, cases will be more thoughtfully reviewed, and decisions
will be more carefully crafted. Constitutional law generally, not just the
states, will be the better for that.
Anyone who supposes that briefs and oral arguments do not affect the
outcome of cases before the Supreme Court is ignorant of the Court's
processes. Some observers think that the justices decide how they will vote
and then fashion reasons to support that result: that the Court's confer-
ence is like a mark-up session on Capitol Hill. This is a caricature of the
Court's deliberations. A Supreme Court decision is the product of a com-
plicated process of argument, drafting, negotiation, compromise, and per-
suasion. Even votes cast in conference are tentative, and justices often
change their minds after hearing what is said in oral argument or after
reading a colleague's draft of an opinion. Only a fool would recommend
that the states, or anyone else, sit back and let the Court do what it will, on
the assumption that the result is foretold. The Supreme Court is con-
stantly adjusting the contours of the law. Values, seemingly submerged,
can reappear again-federalism is one good example. Surely the work of
the nation's highest tribunal deserves the best insights that interested par-
ties, the states included, can give it.
At long last, there are signs of genuine steps toward more effective state
representation in the Supreme Court. The National Institute of Municipal
Law Officers (NIMLO) has created a Legal Advocacy Committee, which,
upon receiving cases from NIMLO headquarters for consideration, can
recommend any one of six "action choices," including litigation or appeals
336. Address before Fifth Circuit Judicial Conference 6 (May 27, 1974).
337. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
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at all levels as well as the Supreme Court.338 In 1980, the National Gover-
nors' Association received a recommendation that the governors create a
Legal Affairs Committee, a step that the governors agreed to at that year's
annual meeting. 339 The Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Re-
lations has added the weight of its prestige by urging the creation of a
mutual "legal defense fund" for state and local governments patterned af-
ter the techniques used so successfully by civil rights and environmental
groups.340 The most promising development toward an effective voice for
the states and their interests is the proposal by Stewart Baker and others
for the creation and funding of a Center for State and Local Legal Advo-
cacy, a project which gathered impetus in January 1982 when the Board of
Trustees of the Academy for Contemporary Problems voted unanimously
to commit $150,000 over a two-year period to establish such a center.34'
Martin Diamond once declared that the American people "understand
in their bones that decentralist-federalism is the constitutional matrix of
the American way of life. . .,34' Having a federalist, rather than a uni-
tary, system entails its frustrations and costs, as many chapters in Ameri-
can history reveal. But, the genius of the American polity depends in good
part on a continuing effort to accommodate viable self-government at the
local level with a national ability to protect individual liberties and other
interests of nationwide importance. As the Supreme Court pursues that
essential accommodation, the process of adjudication will be healthier if
the states' have an articulate voice in the Court's deciding issues of individ-
ual liberties, federalism, and other issues of great moment.
338. The first two reports of the NIMLO committee evaluated six cases and thirteen
cases respectively. Report 80-1 (Feb. 6, 1980); Report 80-2 (April 27, 1980).
339. See Howard, I'LL SEE You IN COURT: THE STATES AND THE SUPREME COURT
(Nat'l Governors' Ass'n, 1980), at 51-52.
340. ACIR, Docket Book, 70th Meeting (June 19-20, 1980), at 126.
341. See Baker & Asperger, Afterword" Toward a Centerfor State and Local LegalAdo-
cacy, 31 CATH. U.L. REV. 505 (1982).
342. Diamond, The Ends ofFederalisr, 3 PUBLIUS 129, 152 (1973).
[Vol. 31:375
